



LASMUN

La Salle Model United Nations

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GENERAL INFORMATION ON LASMUN

Dress Code and National Symbols

As at every UN conference, to keep the integrity of the event, all delegates at LASMUN are required to observe a western business attire, or national equivalent. For example, men should wear full suit (blazer and dress pants), dress shirt, tie, and dress shoes. Similarly, women should wear a blouse and dress pants or skirt, blazer or sweater. If the representation of your delegation can be enhanced by wearing a formal national dress, you may do so if it is carried out with attention to detail and convention, and with maximum of respect. Delegates can bring and display objects that represent their nation, such as small flags, pictures and memorabilia. Such objects are allowed if they are respectful and do not disturb the conference. Alcoholic beverages and weapons of any kind are strictly forbidden and may be confiscated by the Chair and returned to the delegate only by the end of the conference. It is within the Chair's discretion to assess which objects are appropriate to be displayed and which are not.

Award Policy

LASMUN's Award Policy consists in one prize for the Best Delegate and two Honorable Mentions per committee. At the end of the Conference, all delegates shall vote for Best Delegate and for two other delegates whom they believe deserve an Honorable Mention. Members of the LASMUN Staff participating in the simulation cannot be voted. The reward for Best Delegate will be a prize and a certificate. The spirit of the prize is not to enhance competition among delegates, but to reward those that have indeed made their best, setting them as examples and encouraging further improved behavior.

Parliamentary Language

At all times, it is essential that delegates address each other with the maximum of respect. It is conventional and professional to refer to another delegate not as "she" or "he", but as "fellow delegate" or equivalent courteous terms. Similarly, when speaking of the views of their country, delegates should not refer to them as being their own, e.g. do not say "my position", and use instead "my country's position" or, for instance "France's position". The language used during the conferences shall reflect in every way the fact that delegates are representing their countries and that they are trying to politely cooperate with each other.

PARTE ONE LASMUN's Study Guide

GENERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF LASMUN

1. Scope

These rules shall apply to the two committees simulated at the 3rd edition of LASMUN. These General Rules of Procedure shall be considered adopted in advance of the session, and no other rules of procedure will be applicable. These rules were taken from the Handbook of UFRGSMUN 2016, and LASMUN'S 4nd edition Handbook.

2. Language

The official and working language of the conference is English. Delegates will not be permitted to address the Chair, the staff or the committee in another language. The use of foreign expressions will be permitted if followed immediately by a translation into English or if they are current in the English language.

3. Delegations

Each delegation will be represented by one delegate only.

4. Credentials

The name of the member of each delegation shall be submitted to the Secretariat prior to the opening of the Conference. All delegations will be assumed to have proper credentials to participate in the Conference. Delegates are all presumed to possess the diplomatic authority necessary to discuss and vote on the main issue being dealt with by the committee. The instructions and powers given to all delegates do not allow them to declare war, sign or denounce treaties, impose sanctions, or perform any action not strictly within the purview of the committee, unless so determined by the Chair.

5. General Duties of the Delegates

Delegates have the duties of respecting the decisions of the Chair, obtaining the floor before speaking, safeguarding and advocating their country's interests, acting according to their country's foreign policy, and acting with diplomatic decorum always.

6. General Duties of the Secretariat The Secretary-General is the highest-ranking member of the staff. She may designate a staff member to act in her place during any session of the Conference. Along with the UnderSecretary-Generals, she shall direct all the work of the Conference. The Secretary-General or a member of the staff designated by her as her representative may, at any time, address either oral or written statements concerning any matter to the committees.

7. General Duties of the Chair

The committee will be presided over by a Chair, composed of one or two Directors and Assistant-Directors. In addition to exercising the powers which are conferred upon it elsewhere in these rules, the Chair shall declare the opening and closing of each session of the committee, direct its discussions, ensure the observance of these rules, confer the right to speak, and make announcements. It shall rule on Points and Motions without appeal, stipulate the time limit for speakers, and have complete control over and responsibility for the proceedings of the Committee. The Chair may also suggest motions that it deems beneficial for the flow of debate. The Chair representatives have the duty to provide

any clarification on general matters concerning the debate, upon the request of delegates or when deemed necessary.

Nonetheless, the Chair will not supply country's positions to delegates under any circumstance, since the research and preparation regarding such issues are under the delegates' responsibilities. The Chair will treat delegates with due courtesy at all times.

8. Rulings of the Chair

The rulings and decisions of the Committee's Chair are final and not subject to appeal. The members of the Chair are empowered to supersede and interpret the rules as they see fit to guarantee the fruitful progression of the committee's labor.

9. Plagiarism

Plagiarism is understood within the scope of these rules as the unacknowledged use of another individual's words or ideas. When writing position papers, working papers, draft resolutions and during all their participation in the conference, delegates are not allowed to make use of fragments of already existent documents without proper reference. A participant caught plagiarizing any written work will be dealt with accordingly. Punishment may entail disqualification for awards, denied voting and/or speaking rights and possible exclusion from the conference. Applicable legal measures will be taken at the discretion of the conference's organization alone.

RULES GOVERNING DEBATE

Throughout these rules, a "simple majority" will be understood to be one half of the possible votes plus one, rounded down, whereas a "two-third majority" shall consist of two thirds of the possible votes, rounded up. For example, the simple majority of five is three, and the two-third majority of ten is seven.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

10. Quorum

The Chair may declare a session open and permit debate to proceed when at least one third (rounded up) of registered delegations are present. The presence of a simple majority of registered delegations shall be required for any substantive vote to be taken. The Chair shall proceed with a Roll Call at the beginning of each session to recognize the presence of the delegates. The Chair shall inform the delegates of the Quorum whenever required. Every committee shall start with a First Session composed by: Opening Speeches with Speakers List.

11. Opening Plenary Session

Every committee shall start with a First Session composed by two parts: (i) Interactive Dialogues and Briefings; (ii) Opening Speeches with Speakers List. The beginning of this session, therefore, is composed by a Briefing of the topic(s) to be discussed in the Committee, made by a specialist in the area or by some member of the Bureau. This moment may allow the initial interaction of the delegates with the discussion theme. Soon after that, the Bureau will present to the delegates a proposal of agenda on the topics to be discussed. The delegates

may later decide for its adoption or suggest changes to it - if so, the delegates should submit the new agenda to the Bureau, which will present the new document to the committee. Albeit strongly recommended, still, the agenda is not mandatory and the delegates may prefer to go straight to the debate. Following the agenda presentation, each delegation may perform an Opening Speech. This shall contain, essentially, the topics presented in the Country Report, previously sent to the Bureau. In this sense, the delegates must attain themselves to the foreign policy of the country they are representing, according to the topic(s). These Speeches shall be made in accordance with a Speakers List, opened exclusively for this reason. To be included in the list, delegates should raise their placards, provided that the delegation's name is not already on the List. The delegations' names will appear according to the order in which they indicate their desire to speak. The delegation can withdraw its name from the General Speakers List by indicating so to the Bureau. The speech time must be defined by the Bureau in informal voting with the delegations. Even though this Opening Speeches are not mandatory, we strongly encourage all the delegations to participate in it. After the finish of the Speakers List, the Bureau shall automatically change to the Formal-Informal type of debate. Then, to make a Speech, the delegations must raise their placards and wait for the Bureau's indication – it's their prerogative to choose the delegates.

12. Speeches

No delegates may address the Committee without previously obtaining the permission of the Chair. The Chair shall call upon speakers in the order they signify their desire to speak. The speaking time shall be stipulated by the Chair in advance, though it may consult the committee before deciding on the matter. When a delegate has ten seconds of speaking time left, the Chair will make a discreet signal. When the allotted time has expired, the Chair will call the delegate to order.

13. Right of Reply

There is no right of reply. Real or perceived offenses or untruths should be dealt with during normal debate.

14. Working Papers

Working Papers are informal documents that aid the Committee in its discussions on substantive matters. Delegates may propose Working Papers for consideration by the Committee at any time during the Conference. They need not to be written in a specific format, but must be approved by the Chair to be distributed for and to be mentioned in the Committee. There is no need for sponsors of Working Papers.

15. Points

There are three types of Points by which a delegate may address the Chair directly. Should delegates wish to consult the Chair on a matter not covered by any of these three points, they should do it so privately, with the understanding that the Chair will inform the whole committee of the matter if it is deemed to be a general interest.

15.1. Point of Personal Privilege

At any moment during the debate, delegates may raise a Point of Personal Privilege to indicate that they are experiencing extreme personal physical discomfort or being prevented from properly following the discussion. The Chair will attempt to rectify the situation. This point may interrupt a speech if necessary.

15.2. Point of Order

Delegates may raise a Point of Order if they feel that the Rules of Procedure are not being properly followed by the Chair. The Point must be directly related to the rules, and cannot interrupt a speech. The members of the Chair will rule the Point in or out of order as they see fit.

15.3. Point of Inquiry

Delegates may raise a Point of Inquiry when they have a doubt regarding the Rules of Procedure or the flow of debate. This Point cannot interrupt a speech.

16. Debate

16.1. Formal Debate

The Formal debate happens exclusively in the First Session of the committees and must be composed by the Speakers List for the Opening Speeches of the delegations. To be included in the list, delegates should raise their placards, provided that the delegation's name is not already on the List.

16.2 Formal-Informal Debate

This type of debate will happen during all the sessions in all committees after the First Formal Session. This debate is conducted directly by the Chairwoman/Chairman: delegates willing to speak during the Formal-Informal Debate may raise their placards, and will be recognized by the Chair at its discretion. Points of Order and Motions for Adjournment of the Session or Debate can be raised by delegates, according to the Chair indications.

16.3 Informal-Informal

Debate It suspends the Formal-Informal debate so that the delegates can discuss without interference of the Chair, being free to walk in the conference's room and gather in work groups. The objective is to facilitate substantive discussions, such as the draft resolution, by relaxing the structure of the debate imposed by the regular procedures. Therefore, the delegates are encouraged to use this time to work in political groups (i.e. with foreign policy alignment) to draft and negotiate a possible resolution or amendment. To start an Informal-Informal meeting it is necessary that a delegation asks the Bureau to do so. The Chair will then inquire if there are consensus on the matter. In the cases where no consensus is found, a simple majority is necessary for approval of this type of debate. There is not a specific amount of time for this form of debate, but its maximum extension in a row is of 45 minutes. 17. Motion for Adjournment of the Session During discussion of any matter, a delegate may move for the Adjournment of the Session. Such a motion shall not be debated, and shall be put to a vote if there are no other Points that take precedence to it on the floor, requiring a two-third majority to for approval. After the session is adjourned, the Committee shall reconvene at its next regularly schedule session time. As with all motions, the Chair may rule a Motion for Adjournment of the Session out of order.

SPECIAL RULES OF PROCEDURE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

18. Credentials

Delegates must hand over their credentials at the beginning of the first session. These credentials are sent to the delegates by their respective country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in advance. In the case of not having received the Credentials delegates must contact the Secretariat. Delegates are encouraged to write letters to their governments to obtain authorization to undertake actions beyond those listed in the credentials section of the General Rules of Procedure or request needed information.

19. Conduct during voting on a Draft Resolution

The Secretary-General shall immediately bring to the attention of all representatives on the Security Council all communications from States, organs of the United Nations, or concerns regarding any matter that requires consideration of the Security Council in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. The Secretary-General may designate members from Secretariat to attend any council's meetings. The selected members from the Secretariat must provide logistical and technical support to the Security Council's discussions, entertaining the Council with any formal or informal documents specifically sent to the Council or addressing any matters under its consideration. Draft-communicés reporting on behalf of the Council may also be sent to its appreciation, whenever the Secretariat finds it.

SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

20. Voting Majorities

Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by a simple majority of nine members. Decisions of the Security Council on substantive matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members with no negative votes on the part of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI on the UN Charter and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. The matters hereby considered as substantive are the approval of Amendments to the Draft Resolution, the approval of Draft Resolutions and approval of clauses/parts in a division of the question.

21. Form of Debate

6.1 Unless otherwise stated by the committee, all sessions of the Security Council are presumed to be closed until the adjournment of the session, except for the First Session, when takes place the reading of the Briefing and/or the Interactive Dialogue, and when the delegates may deliver an Opening Speech, available to the Press. Closed sessions are secret and information on the proceedings is entrusted to the discretion of the participants. This is meant to facilitate discussion and negotiation between members of the Council as the conversations will be confidential and undocumented.

6.2 Closed Sessions follow the format of a Formal/Informal Debate at all times, except in the case of shifting to an Informal-Informal Debate. Besides the Point of Order described in the General Rules of Procedure, the following motions will be allowed during closed sessions (according to the order of precedence): (i) Motion for adjournment of the session; (ii) Motion for adjournment of the debate; (iii) Motion of no confidence; (iv) Motion for an open session; (v) Motion to issue a presidential statement.

6.2.1 A motion for an open session is functional when the action phase on a draft resolution is about to begin (i.e. after its introduction and during its voting). The Presidency must consult the Council about opening the session with a voting procedure. If a simple majority decide in favor of opening the session, all statements will be duly recorded and made available to the Press.

6.2.2 Any delegate may raise a motion to issue a UNSC Presidential Statement, which is a UN official document meant to inform the public on some of the deliberations of the UNSC. If the motion is ruled to be in order, the delegate will read the proposed text for the statement, and the president will ask if any Council member objects to it. It must be approved by consensus. There being no objection, the statement is considered to be issued and released to the public. There is no specific format.

6.3 During Open Sessions, the following motions will be allowed (according to the order of precedence): (i) Motion for adjournment of the session; (ii) Motion for adjournment of debate; (iii) Motion for a closed session.

6.3.1 A motion for a closed session is a procedural matter, which will immediately be put to a vote. If the motion passes, the session will be immediately closed to the public, statements will no longer be recorded and all individuals who do not belong to the Secretariat or to the delegations represented in the Council will be asked to leave the room.

22. Participation in Council Deliberations

Should any member of the Council wish to invite an individual or representative of an organization or government to participate (without entitlement to vote on substantive matters) in the deliberations of the Council, he or she should submit a written request to the President of the Council. The President will ask if any Council member objects to the invitation. There being no objection, the invitation will be issued.

23. Letter to the Secretary-General

Should any member of the Council wish to issue a letter addressed directly to the Secretary-General, or intended to be transmitted to an organization or government relevant to the deliberations of the Council, he or she should submit the proposed letter and a request in writing to the President of the Council. The President will ask if any Council member objects to the letter. There being no objection, the letter will be issued.

24. Presidency

The presidency of the Security Council shall be held in turn by the delegations that wish to do so. Each President shall hold office for the length of one session. Lots will be drawn in the first session among delegations willing to hold the presidency. Whenever the president of the session is seen to be fulfilling its responsibilities in a manner unsatisfactory to the members of the UNSC and the Secretariat, a change in the presidency is in order. It requires an informal written request signed by at least three members, one of which must be a permanent member of the Council. This change will be put to a vote if the Secretariat deems appropriate and requires a simple majority to pass. If the vote passes, the presidency devolves for the rest of the session on the delegations scheduled to preside the next session. Should this occur, the plan would remain unchanged for the following sessions. Some delegations may be called upon to preside over multiple sessions. The President shall preside over the meetings of the Security Council and, under the authority of the Security Council, shall represent it in its capacity as an organ of the United Nations.

25. Presidential Statements

Any delegate may move to Issue a UNSC Presidential Statement, which is a UN official document meant to inform the public on some of the deliberations of the UNSC. If the Motion is ruled to be in order, the delegate will read the proposed text for the statement, and the president will ask if any Council member objects to it. There being no objection, the statement is considered to be issued and released to the public.

26. Draft Resolutions and Amendments

In Closed Sessions, more than one Draft Resolution and Amendments may be on the floor at the same time. All the Draft Resolutions and Amendments shall be discussed simultaneously, yet the Council may approve only one resolution per topic. Before being introduced for debate, all Draft Resolutions and Amendments require the approval of the Secretariat. Draft Resolutions require five signatures and Amendments require three signatures to be introduced.

Once a Draft Resolution or an Amendment has been introduced, it can be withdrawn only if all signatories remove their signatures. Friendly Amendments are allowed. Before voting an Amendment, delegates can move for Roll Call Voting. Draft Resolutions are voted in open sessions; therefore, the Roll Call Voting is automatically in order.

SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS

27. Draft Resolutions

Before being introduced for debate, all Draft Resolutions require the approval of the Chair. All Draft Resolutions also require 5 signatures to be introduced and a simple majority to pass. Signing a Draft Resolution does not necessarily indicate that a delegation support its ideas, but only that it desires to have the Draft Resolution discussed. A signatory of a Draft Resolution is not required to vote in favor of it. The Draft Resolution needs its signatories' support to continue on the floor. In the event of all signatories withdrawing their signatures, debate on the Draft Resolution is ceased. Other delegations may add their signatures to the Draft Resolution in the course of the debate. In general debate on a topic, there may be more than one Draft Resolution on the floor at the same time. All the Draft Resolutions shall be discussed simultaneously on the General Speakers List. Only one Draft Resolution may be approved by the Committee. A Draft Resolution will remain on the floor until debate on that specific Draft Resolution is closed or another Draft Resolution on the topic passes. There will be no time limit to debate on one topic.

27.1 Motion for Introduction of Draft Resolution

Delegates may move for the Introduction of a Draft Revolution once it has been approved by the Chair and distributed to the Committee. This motion does not require a vote to pass; once accepted by the Chair it is automatically approved. The Chair will then grant the floor to one of the signatories of the Draft Resolution for the time required for him/her to read its operative clauses. After the Draft Resolution is read, the Chair asks for questions, which shall be limited to grammar or technical matters on the document and may not pertain to the substance of the Draft Resolution.

27.2 Motion for Introduction of an Amendment

Delegates may amend any Draft Resolution that is on the floor. Amendments may add, subtract, or modify parts of the Draft Resolution. An Amendment requires the approval of the Chair and the signatures of three members of the

Committee. Signing an Amendment does not constitute or require a vote in favor of it. After a Motion for the Introduction of an Amendment is approved by the Chair, debate on the General Speakers List shall be suspended and a Special Speakers List shall be established for and against the specific Amendment. A Motion for Closure of the Special Speakers List or a Motion to Close Debate on the Amendment will be in order after the Committee has heard at least two speakers in favor of the Amendment and two speakers against, when available. When debate is closed on the Amendment, the Committee shall proceed to an immediate vote, which may be a Roll Call Vote if so moved. Following the voting procedure, debate according to the General Speakers List shall resume. Once an Amendment is approved, it becomes part of the Draft Resolution, which means that it is no longer considered an Amendment.

27.3 Friendly Amendment

When all the current signatories of a Draft Resolution on the floor agree to modify any part of its operative clauses, they may do so through a Friendly Amendment, which has the same effects of a regular Amendment. A Friendly Amendment must be presented on a written format to the Chair for its approval. After approving it, the Chair will ask if all the signatories of the Draft Resolution support the Friendly Amendment and, if they do so, it will automatically become part of the Draft Resolution. In case any signatory is absent or does not agree on the Friendly Amendment, it will be discarded. Yet, it may be presented again as a regular Amendment.

27.4 Procedure of Approval by Consensus

The resolution will be read aloud by one of the signatories. Delegations can suggest, if necessary, grammatical or technical corrections to the document (content-related questions cannot be altered). After, the Bureau will ask if any delegation opposes the Draft Resolution - this is not to happen, in general. If none, the resolution is approved and the discussion addresses the next topic, if there is one.

27.5 Procedure of Approval by Voting

In case there is not a consensus, the Draft Resolution is introduced to the debate if approved by the Bureau: from this moment on, the Draft becomes the sole focus of discussion of the committee, which is obliged to approve the document or reject it. Just after its introduction, the Draft is read aloud by one of the signatories, and the delegations can suggest, if necessary, grammatical or technical corrections to the document. When this process is completed, the committee returns to the normal flow of the debate.

27.6 Motion for Division of the Question

After debate has been closed and the Chair has started the voting procedures on a Draft Resolution, a delegate may move for the Operative Clauses of the Draft Resolution to be voted on separately. Perambulatory and Sub-Operative Clauses may not be divided this way. If a delegate moves for a Division of the Question, the Chair shall recognize two speakers in favor and two speakers against the Motion if available. A simple majority is needed for the Motion to pass (this is a procedural vote, with no abstentions allowed). If it does pass, a five-minute Unmoderated Caucus will be automatically granted to the Committee so that delegates can discuss, prepare, and present to the Chair, in written format, their proposals to divide the question. The Committee will hear two speakers in favor and two speakers against every proposal of division before voting it until one is approved. No abstentions are allowed in these votes, as they are procedural matters. If no proposals are approved by simple majority, the Draft Resolution shall be voted as a whole. When one of the proposals is approved, a separate vote shall be taken on each divided part to determine whether it shall be included in the Draft Resolution to be voted later. For the Operative Clauses to remain in the Draft Resolution, a

simple majority of the votes is required. The substantive nature of this vote means abstentions are permitted.

28. Motion for Roll Call Voting

After debate has been closed on a Draft Resolution or Amendment, a delegate may move for a Roll Call Vote. In a Roll Call Vote, the Chair will recognize, in alphabetical order each voting delegate, who must state his/her vote. Delegates may vote in favor, against or abstain. Once recognized by the Chair, the motion for a Roll Call Voting is automatically approved and does not require a vote to pass. During a Roll Call Vote, delegates may choose to pass their turn of voting and wait for another roll call round to state their actual vote. However, delegates who pass their vote are not allowed to abstain from voting. Moreover, delegates are allowed to pass only once.

GUIDE ON WRITING RESOLUTIONS

4 Draft Resolutions

The United Nations does not pass “laws”, it passes Resolutions. A Resolution is a way of bringing pressure upon Member States, of expressing an opinion on a pressing matter, or recommending some action to be taken by the UN or other agency. Draft Resolutions should not be introduced into formal session until they have circulated among other delegates to incorporate different perspectives and to build support. It is desirable for a Draft Resolution to be sponsored by several States or by an entire bloc. Delegates should not bring pre-written Resolutions to the Conference. Pre-written Resolutions are not only frowned upon by the Secretariat, but will inevitably alienate the other delegates in the committee. The process of writing Resolutions in committee with other delegates is designed to teach delegates the subtler forms of negotiations and concessions. Prefabricated Resolutions obviously pre-empt this process. When drafting and sponsoring a resolution, keep in mind that the wording will greatly influence its appeal. The Resolution should be clear, concise and specific. The substance should be well researched, and reflect the character and interests of the sponsorship nations. Being a signatory to a Resolution only means that delegates want to see it put on the floor; it does not indicate sponsorship or support and the signatory has no further obligations. For instance, you might be against a Draft Resolution but might want to see it debated to be able to convince other countries who have written the Draft Document.

4 Drafting a Resolution

UN Resolutions follow a common format. A resolution is one long sentence, with commas and semi-colons used to separate the ideas and a period at the very end of the document. They should be single-spaced, with each line numbered in the left-hand margin. Resolutions consist of three main parts:

.1 The Heading

The heading of the Draft Resolution should read as follows:

COMMITTEE: the name of the organ where it was introduced;

SUBJECT: the topic of the resolution;

SPONSORED BY: list of sponsoring nations. A document number will be given to the resolution as part of the heading and it will be referred to by its number for the remainder of the simulation.

.2 The Perambulatory

Causes Within the preamble of a Resolution, one will not find clauses proposing action or making substantive statements. The perambulatory clauses explain the purpose of the resolution and state the main reasons for the suggestions to follow. This is where previous UN Resolutions are referred to and relevant precedents of international law are cited. The preamble may also include altruistic appeals to the common sense or humanitarian instincts of Member States regarding the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc. Each clause begins with an italicized participle and is followed by a comma after the sentence.

Affirming	Emphasizing	Keeping in mind
Alarmed by	Expecting	Noting with regret
Approving	Fulfilling	Noting with
Aware of	Fully aware	satisfaction
Believing	Fully alarmed	Noting with deep
Bearing in mind	Fully believing	concern
Confident	Further deploring	Noting with
Convinced	Guided by	approval
Declaring	Having adopted	Observing
Deeply concerned	Having considered	Realizing
Deeply convinced	Having examined	Reaffirming
Deeply disturbed	Having studied	Recognizing
Deeply regretting	Having heard	Recalling
Desiring	Having received	Welcoming

.3 The Operative Clauses

The operative clauses list the recommendations for action, or state a favorable or unfavorable opinion regarding the existing situation. These actions can be as vague as a denunciation of a certain situation or a call for negotiations, or specific as a call for a ceasefire or monetary commitment for a Project. Remember that only Security Council Resolutions are binding on Member States, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council can only make recommendations. Operative clauses begin with an active, present tense verb and are followed by a semicolon in the end of the sentence. The first word in each operative clause is italicized. Operative clauses are numbered, beginning with “1”.

The follow words are a partial list of appropriate terms for initiative operative clauses:

Accepts	Designates	Notes
Approves	Emphasizes	Proclaims
Authorizes	Encourages	Reaffirms
Calls	Endorses	Recommends
Calls upon	Expresses its	Reminds
Commands	appreciation	Regrets
Condemns	Expresses its hope	Requests
Congratulates	Further invites	Reiterates
Confirms	Further proclaims	Solemnly affirms
Considers	Further reminds	
Decides	Further	
Declares	recommends	
Accordingly	Further resolves	
Demands	Further requests	
Deplores	Further urges	
Draws the attention	Has resolved	

PART TWO LASMUN's Study Guide

THE STATE OF HUNGER IN NORTHEAST AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the complex and interrelated factors contributing to food insecurity in Northeast Africa, focusing on the Horn of Africa, which includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. The region's historical challenges, such as colonial legacies and arbitrary border divisions, have left lasting impacts on political stability and governance, exacerbating social and ethnic tensions and hindering effective agricultural and food security policies. Furthermore, the region is highly vulnerable to environmental shocks, such as droughts and desertification, which, compounded by climate change, significantly disrupt agricultural productivity and worsen hunger. In addition, the concentration of economic power in the hands of elites and socioeconomic inequalities, particularly in rural areas, deepen the crisis, making equitable access to resources and food a continuous struggle. The region's ongoing conflicts and political instability further complicate the situation, as wars and power struggles destroy infrastructure, displace populations, and disrupt humanitarian aid efforts. In Somalia, for instance, factional fighting impedes the delivery of food and assistance to vulnerable communities. Similarly, the economic effects of external factors, such as the disruption of wheat imports due to the war in Ukraine, further strain food security in countries like Somalia. Humanitarian interventions, while vital, face numerous challenges, including logistical barriers, conflict, and corruption, making the delivery of aid difficult. National and regional efforts, such as Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), Kenya's Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), and Somalia's Baxnaano program, have aimed to address these issues through social protection systems. While these programs have had some success in providing targeted assistance, their effectiveness is often undermined by political instability, insufficient funding, and the scale of the crises. In conclusion, the paper argues that while international aid and local initiatives are crucial in alleviating food insecurity, a comprehensive, long-term approach is needed to address the underlying political, economic, and environmental factors. Sustainable solutions must focus on strengthening governance, enhancing regional cooperation, and improving climate resilience to ensure food security and stability in Northeast Africa.

1. STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF THE HUNGER

Northeast Africa, also known as the Horn of Africa or the Somali Peninsula, refers to the region that includes the countries of Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. This region has a long political and economic history that contributes to its current situation.

Historian Basil Davidson, specializing in African history, asserts in his book *The Black Man's Burden* that much of the region's developmental difficulties stem from its colonial legacy. For example, the artificial borders drawn during the Berlin Conference were established based on ethnic and tribal groups without considering the region's geographical, cultural, and social realities. Davidson explains that these arbitrary borders were drawn using Western models, forcing traditional African societies to adapt to a political structure unfamiliar to them. This created social and ethnic tensions that resulted in civil conflicts, political instability, and a continuous struggle for national unity. Instead of prioritizing

the construction of inclusive and strong institutions, most African states inherited an authoritarian and centralized governance system. Combined with a lack of social cohesion, this resulted in fragile and unstable governments.

Due to government fragility and the constant concern with maintaining control, policies for agricultural development and combating hunger have often been neglected. This directly impacts economic development and food security, as governments lack the will or capacity to promote equitable resource distribution.

Another factor exacerbating the hunger situation in the northeastern part of the continent is the socioeconomic inequalities affecting access to essential resources. Authors such as Amartya Sen and Stephen Devereux argue that hunger is not necessarily a result of food scarcity but rather of economic and social inequalities that prevent society from accessing such resources. In the region in question, this inequality is most evident in the agricultural sector, where smallholders reliant on subsistence farming struggle with a lack of access to basic resources such as land, credit, and infrastructure. The concentration of economic power in the hands of elites worsens the disparity, making the region more susceptible to crises and deepening food insecurity.

The territory is vulnerable to environmental shocks, such as droughts and desertification, with these impacts being more pronounced among the poorest rural populations. There are no effective public policies aimed at developing agricultural infrastructure and mitigating the effects of climate change, which affects the economy and exacerbates hunger. Additionally, the high number of armed conflicts in the region destroys infrastructure and displaces communities, further increasing the difficulty of accessing food and resources.

In *Theories of Famine*, the author concludes that the solution to this problem lies in addressing the root causes of these socioeconomic inequalities, with investments in rural development and policies supporting the poorest. Tackling these inequalities is crucial to breaking the cycle of hunger affecting millions in the region.

2. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS

Each year, new records for global temperature rise are being broken, with 2023 being recorded as the hottest year to date. According to the 2023 reports from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the global average annual temperature reached 1.45 ± 0.12 °C above pre-industrial levels (1850-1900) in the past year, with the second half of the year, specifically July and August, recording the highest temperatures.

The African continent has been one of the hardest hit by rising temperatures in recent decades, with a warming rate of 0.3 °C per decade between 1991 and 2023, slightly faster than the global average. Several countries have broken their historical temperature records and are experiencing extreme heatwaves, prolonged and severe droughts, above-normal precipitation, and consequently, flooding to this day. These events are causing significant economic and social damage across various countries, including Northeast Africa.

In recent years, Northeast Africa, known as the Horn of Africa, has faced prolonged droughts, affecting agriculture and leading to high levels of hunger and food insecurity. Estimated numbers of people suffering from hunger, after three years of drought, exceed 23 million across the region (WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 2023). In Ethiopia, it is estimated that 7.2 million people are facing food insecurity, in Somalia approximately 6 million (WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, 2022), and in Kenya around 3.1 million (KENYA, 2022).

Within the region's agricultural sector, cereal production has been most affected by irregular rainfall and other climatic factors experienced in recent years. Countries like Sudan have seen their sorghum and millet production reduced by between 25% and 50% when comparing 2022 to 2023 due to irregular rains. In Kenya's main unimodal rainfall agricultural zones—Central, Rift Valley, and Western provinces—the sector benefited from rains ranging from normal

to above average. However, the total maize production for this long-rains season was estimated to be 5% to 10% below the average of the past five years due to irregular rains in bimodal and marginal agricultural areas, resulting in smaller harvests in these regions. The 40-year average rainfall was significantly surpassed over much of the territory. Increased pastures, forage, and water resources contributed to livestock production. There were also increases in agricultural production and job opportunities. However, in the northern and northeastern regions of Kenya, flooding affected about 640,600 hectares of land, including approximately 18,300 hectares of cultivated land. In Ethiopia, the Deyr and Hageya rains reached record cumulative levels for the past 40 years, causing major floods in the Somali, Oromia, and southern Ethiopia regions, leading to significant losses in seasonal crops among farming communities, particularly in areas near the Shebelle and Omo rivers. Approximately 27,000 animals died, and over 72,000 hectares of crops were destroyed (WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, 2023).

3. ROLE OF CONFLICTS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Northeast Africa is dealing with ongoing wars, conflicts, and political instability, which make life very difficult for people in the region. These problems disrupt governments and destroy important structures, leading to severe consequences for agriculture and food supplies. In Somalia, the situation is especially bad. The country is divided among various armed groups, making it hard to get humanitarian aid and food to people who can't grow enough crops to feed themselves. This chaos means that many people are struggling to get the help they need, and agriculture is in serious trouble.

Sudan has faced its own set of issues. The country went through a long civil war from 1983 to 2005, which caused massive damage to its agricultural infrastructure. After that, the Darfur War broke out, making things even worse. This conflict has led to food shortages and has forced many people to flee their homes to escape the violence. The ongoing power struggles in Sudan make it hard for the country to recover and rebuild its farming systems.

A big problem in the region is the competition for limited resources like water and fertile land. Climate change is making things worse by causing persistent droughts and extreme weather. As farmland becomes less productive, people fight over the remaining good land, leading to more violence and worsening food shortages. External conflicts also play a role in the food crisis. For example, Somalia depends on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine, which make up more than 90% of its wheat supply. The war between these two countries has disrupted global grain markets, causing shortages and driving up food prices. Rising fuel costs make it even harder for people, especially poor farmers and those in conflict zones, to buy the food they need.

4. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Humanitarian interventions primarily rely on the efforts of international organizations, NGOs, and local governments to address the issues of hunger and food insecurity. These organizations typically work in partnership with local and regional governments. Notable examples include the World Food Programme (WFP), the Red Cross, and Oxfam, which play crucial roles by providing food, technical assistance, and nutrition programs to vulnerable populations. Their aim is to tackle food crises resulting from droughts, armed conflicts, and forced displacements.

However, conflicts and political instability often complicate the logistics of delivering aid. The presence of armed groups and the destruction of infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, make it challenging to distribute food and other essential supplies effectively. Additionally, bureaucratic barriers imposed by some governments and local corruption interfere with the allocation of aid, diverting resources away from those who need them most.

For instance, in South Sudan, a country in the Horn of Africa, the region has been embroiled in conflict between the RSF (Rapid Support Forces) and the SPLA (Sudanese People's Liberation Army) generals since April 2023. Since the onset of the war, access to humanitarian aid has been extremely difficult, as both military factions have imposed deliberate blockades at the borders to prevent looting of aid supplies. The situation has been further worsened by outbreaks of cholera, heavy rains, floods, and poor sanitation conditions. On August 22 of this year, the borders in the Darfur region were opened for the passage of supplies for three months. Despite access restrictions and a lack of funding, humanitarian partners have continued to strive to assist the region.

5. SOLUÇÕES LOCAIS E SUSTENTABILIDADE

In Northeast Africa, where drought-prone conditions pose significant challenges to agricultural productivity, targeted strategies for irrigation management and sustainable land practices are essential. Recent documents highlight that improving agricultural output in this region depends on two key measures: expanding irrigation infrastructure and implementing sustainable land management practices.

The use of irrigation technology, such as windmills and small dams, has proven crucial in enhancing crop yields and enabling more intensive farming in areas that traditionally rely on rain-fed agriculture. By expanding irrigation systems, farmers can better manage water resources, mitigate the impacts of drought, and improve overall crop production.

Sustainable agriculture initiatives in Northeast Africa focus on addressing food insecurity and adapting to climate change. These projects often incorporate agroforestry systems, such as the "Taungya" system, which integrates timber and crop cultivation to enhance soil fertility and carbon sequestration. The use of nitrogen-fixing trees like *Jatropha* and *Calliandra* further contributes to soil health and provides socio-economic benefits to local communities.

Advanced irrigation techniques, including drip irrigation, are employed to maximize water efficiency, particularly in drought-prone areas. These systems help optimize water use and support consistent agricultural production. Additionally, Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs are gaining traction by providing financial incentives to farmers who adopt sustainable practices. These initiatives reward farmers for reducing carbon emissions, preserving ecosystems, and enhancing soil health.

Afforestation and reforestation efforts are also crucial in building resilience to drought and improving food security. By integrating rural communities into larger market systems and providing access to credit, these sustainable agriculture projects aim to enhance the livelihoods of local farmers.

6. SOCIAL AND HEALTH IMPACTS OF HUNGER

Hunger in Northeast Africa is devastating to the health and social development of its populations. Prolonged lack of food results in acute malnutrition, leading to severe weight loss and deficiencies in essential vitamins and minerals. This compromises the immune system and increases vulnerability to diseases. One of the most severe consequences is chronic malnutrition, which affects millions of people, especially children. Malnourished children are more likely to suffer from respiratory infections, diarrhea, and malaria, and without proper treatment and access to these regions, these conditions are often fatal. This contributes to some of the highest child mortality rates in the world, with Somalia, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, all countries in the Horn of Africa, having some of the highest rates.

In addition to impacting health, hunger is directly linked to the impairment of social and economic development in the affected societies. Children who suffer from malnutrition from an early age experience compromised physical and cognitive growth, resulting in limitations in learning and poor academic performance. This drastically reduces their chances of obtaining formal education, creating a cycle of poverty and dependency. Moreover, hunger can affect access to education itself, as many children are forced to leave school to help their families find food or work to supplement family income.

Hunger leads to a collapse of social structures, increasing instability as entire communities suffer from the loss of human capital and face challenges in social cohesion and economic mobility. It can also exacerbate conflicts, as groups compete for scarce resources, leading to population displacement and prolonged humanitarian crises. All these effects are interconnected, illustrating how hunger in this region is not just a health issue but also a problem that affects various aspects of society, including long-term social and economic development.

7. GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

In addition to international and humanitarian aid, countries in Northeast Africa are also seeking solutions and collaborating regionally to implement government programs aimed at providing financial and food assistance to vulnerable families across their territories.

In Ethiopia, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) was established several decades ago as a national social protection initiative. The program addresses both chronic food insecurity and sporadic events like droughts. It serves a population highly vulnerable to climate impacts and offers a practical model of how social protection programs can be designed to support the most vulnerable and reduce disaster risks and climate-related impacts. The PSNP also involves public works activities aimed at improving climate resilience, a risk financing facility to help families cope with temporary shocks, and targeting methods to ensure that the most vulnerable have access to benefits. Over the years, the PSNP has operated efficiently due to the absence of conflict, and it has been expanded to respond to the current crisis. However, the ongoing conflict between the Tigray region and the federal government, which erupted in 2020, has undermined the program's effectiveness in addressing food insecurity.

In Kenya, the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), which ran until 2018, aimed to provide financial assistance through cash transfers during emergency periods and on a regular basis. Among other goals, it sought to ensure the effective, financially secure, and well-targeted use of safety nets and cash transfer programs to support the most vulnerable. During the second phase of the program, from 2013 to 2018, 100,000 families benefited from the HSNP. Additionally, in the fiscal year 2020/2021, the Kenyan government allocated \$308 million to social protection. However, this amount proved insufficient in light of the growing needs in recent years.

Somalia launched the Baxnaano program in 2019, officially known as the Shock-Responsive Safety Net for Human Capital Project (SNHCP) of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), with support from the World Bank. The program aims to address poverty, create mechanisms to prepare people for climate and hunger shocks, and transition Somalia from a prolonged humanitarian response to a state-led, shock-responsive social safety net system. However, according to a 2022 report by Refugees International, the program remains in its early stages and is not yet robust enough, in both scope and capacity, to play a central role in combating food insecurity in Somalia.

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STRATEGIC REPOSITIONING OF EUROPE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

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ABSTRACT

Europe's strategic repositioning in the context of the war in Ukraine is a critical and adaptive response to the new geopolitical challenges posed by the conflict. Since February 2022, with the escalation of the conflict, the invasion of Ukraine has profoundly changed the dynamics of European security and beyond. This situation has not only forced an internal reassessment of European countries with their alliances and defense strategies, but has also challenged the post-Cold War security order. Organizations such as the European Union and NATO play important roles in responding to conflicts such as these, and in this specific case it has meant an adjustment in the strategies and approaches used to confront rising threats, with a view to guaranteeing regional stability. In order to maintain the system's effectiveness, several points need to be reviewed, such as military capabilities, strengthening regional integration, redefining security policies and immediately adapting to new scenarios on a continent in transformation.

5. INTRODUCTION

Since the Russian Revolution in 1917 and establishment of Soviet Union which followed, ideological and political tensions between East (Soviet states) societies started taking its soar vis-a-vis West (Non-Soviet developed nations). U.S. and European nations, as well Western capitalist powers in general saw Soviet Socialism as a threat to their political / economic systems; Those tensions still simmered on a somewhat back burner over the First and Second World Wars, but they boiled madly from 1945 onwards. As a war-torn Europe shuddered at the specter of Soviet expansionism, further fueled by USSR influence in Eastern European countries, these Western powers scrambled for cover. All of this led to the formation in April 1949 by twelve countries (the United States, Canada and ten European nations) of NATO or North Atlantic Treaty Organization: a strategic defense alliance aimed at collective security while promoting shared values like freedom, democracy and rule-of-law societies.

While the breakup of the USSR in 1991 held out hope for a decrease in East-West tensions at line, nevertheless, the slow creep of former Warsaw Pact members into NATO brought Russian fears about Western expansion back to life. Russia saw NATO's advance to its borders as a direct security threat, especially under Vladimir Putin.

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These fears were compounded by Ukraine's long historical relationship with Russia, which began when it was absorbed into the Russian Empire and continued throughout its existence as a Soviet republic. After Ukraine declared itself independent in August 1991, the country had cooperative and sometimes confrontational relations with Russia. Russia saw Ukraine's possible entry into NATO as a threat to its power and stability in the region. Things became worse, climaxing with Russia's annexation of Crimea and its backing the secessionist movements in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. The ongoing hostilities culminated in Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The result was to heighten the presence of NATO in Eastern Europe, push Russia into greater diplomatic isolation and closer partnership with China. In addition, the fighting has roiled global markets affecting supplies of grains and energy resources to countries that rely on such commodities.

5. NATO DECISION MAKING PROCESS

NATO's decision-making process, based on Santos, A. S. *O Poder de Decisão na OTAN*. In Seminário “Portugal e as Operações de Paz da Bósnia”⁶ and NATO Official Website⁷ operates on a consensus basis among its 32 member countries, balancing diverse perspectives and ensuring collective responsibility. Consensus does not require unanimity but instead avoids formal objections from any member, allowing decisions that respect the strategic interests of all parties. This structure ensures that every member state participates in decisions, even when disagreements exist. NATO is organized into three main bodies: organizations and agencies that provide logistical support; a civilian structure focusing on diplomatic and political coordination; and a military structure responsible for strategy and tactical planning. Together, these entities support NATO’s mission to integrate political and military considerations effectively.

The decision-making process unfolds in structured stages designed to address crises efficiently. Initially, Crisis Identification occurs, during which the North Atlantic Council (NAC) —NATO’s primary political decision-making body—assesses the nature and scale of a given crisis. Intelligence and political analysis play a critical role here, as the NAC determines whether NATO’s involvement is warranted, potentially including military intervention. If necessary, the NAC consults other NATO bodies to clarify specific issues and ensure all factors are considered in defining the crisis's scope.

Following this, a Political-Military Assessment takes place, in which the NAC, with input from the Military Committee (MC), evaluates the crisis from both political and military perspectives. As NATO's highest military authority, the MC advises the NAC on military objectives and potential courses of action, ensuring that proposed responses align with NATO’s strategic goals. The MC coordinates with all NATO military operations to maintain consistency with the overarching political objectives set by the NAC.

In the Military Options Development stage, the NAC requests the NATO Military Authorities (NMA) to devise a range of possible military responses, each tailored to the political and strategic goals identified. These options offer flexibility, allowing the NAC to select a strategy that best balances military feasibility with political intent. After careful consideration, the NAC then engages in Option Selection, choosing the alternative that most closely aligns with NATO's broader objectives and resources.

Once a specific course of action is selected, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) is developed. The NAC tasks the NMAs to draft this concept, providing a strategic outline of the mission and specifying necessary resources and

⁶ SANTOS, A. S. *O Poder de Decisão na OTAN*. In Seminário “Portugal e as Operações de Paz da Bósnia”. Lisboa: Instituto da Defesa Nacional, 1999.

⁷ NATO. *NATO Headquarters*. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm>. Accessed on: Sept. 25, 2023.

operational timelines. The CONOPS is supported by a Statement of Requirements (SOR) that lists the personnel, equipment, and logistical elements essential to the mission's success. This step ensures that both strategic planning and resource allocation are tightly coordinated.

With the concept in place, the Operations Planning and Approval phase follows. Here, Strategic Commanders, including Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) and Supreme Commanders such as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), refine the CONOPS into a detailed Operations Plan (OPLAN). This plan includes tactical directives and contingencies to prepare for various scenarios within the mission. The Military Committee reviews the OPLAN to ensure military coherence and adherence to NATO's objectives, and, upon MC endorsement, the plan is forwarded to the NAC for Final Approval.

In the final phases, Activation and Implementation ensue. Once the NAC approves the OPLAN, Activation Warning Messages (ACTWARN) and Activation Orders (ACTORD) are issued to ready NATO forces and prepare for deployment. SACEUR then implements the plan, issuing specific orders to operational units, thus putting NATO's collective defense strategies into action.

Throughout the operation, Monitoring and Control is conducted by both the NAC and the Military Committee. This oversight ensures the mission remains aligned with NATO's strategic objectives and that adjustments are made in response to any situational changes. Regular reporting and assessments allow member countries to remain engaged and informed, reinforcing NATO's commitment to collective defense and strategic adaptability.

In summary, NATO's decision-making process is a multilayered, consensus-driven approach that integrates political and military objectives across a structured framework. From initial crisis identification to implementation and monitoring, each stage upholds NATO's commitment to collaborative decision-making and strategic flexibility, ensuring that responses to global security challenges are effective, cohesive, and aligned with the interests of its member states.

5. EUROPEAN STRATEGIC REPOSITIONING

After the end of the Cold War, the security landscape in Europe underwent profound transformations. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact shifted the balance of power on the continent. In the 1990s, Europe experienced a period of relative stability, with many Eastern European countries democratizing and seeking integration into the European Union (EU) and NATO. During this period, NATO and the EU expanded, incorporating former Soviet bloc members such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999, along with other Eastern European countries in the 2000s.

This expansion aimed to consolidate security and democracy in Europe, however, the growing Western influence created tensions with Russia, which began to see NATO's expansion as a threat to its own security. Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a new phase of instability in Europe. This conflict triggered the greatest security crisis on the continent since World War II, leading to a significant increase in defense spending by European countries and a realignment of security policies. NATO significantly boosted its military presence in European countries, while the EU imposed severe economic sanctions on Russia and intensified its military and financial support for Ukraine.

Since 2014, with the Ukraine crisis, NATO has renewed its collective defense concept, focusing on deterrence and defense against Russia. Many European countries increased their defense investments to meet the Alliance's goal of 2% of GDP. The creation of the European Defense Fund and other initiatives to promote the EU's strategic autonomy also reflect efforts to independently strengthen European defense capabilities. As a result of these events, NATO countries have organized their military forces over the years to ensure the security of member states. To analyze the reactive effect of European countries belonging to the Alliance, it is necessary to assess the military capacity and investment level of each member within the organization.

3.1. Analysis of the political and military strength of the major NATO powers

The major NATO powers are not only the most influential countries on the global stage but also those that contribute the most financially and militarily to the alliance. Currently, the countries that allocate the most financial resources to NATO are Poland, Estonia, and the United States, each investing more than 3% of their respective GDPs in defense spending⁸. For Poland, this investment is crucial, as it shares a border with Ukraine and feels directly threatened in the event of an escalation in the conflict in the region. In 2023, then-Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki had pledged to increase defense spending to 4% of GDP to accelerate the country's military strengthening⁹. This proposal has been upheld by the current Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, who has secured the allocation of 4.12% of the national GDP to defense, surpassing NATO's 2% target¹⁰.

Poland's defense budget for 2024 is projected at \$35 billion, with massive investments in tanks, aircraft, and the fortification of the country's eastern border. NATO has recognized Poland as an emerging power, playing a crucial role in maintaining the Alliance's military structure. This recognition is partly due to Poland allocating 51.1% of its defense budget to equipment acquisition, more than double NATO's guideline of 20% for this purpose¹¹. However, it is important to note that Poland still faces some challenges, mainly due to shortages of personnel and equipment to operate at full capacity¹². To enhance its security, Poland signed a Foreign Military Financing agreement with the United States in July, worth \$2 billion, aimed at strengthening its defense capabilities¹³.

The United States remains the primary investor in NATO, accounting for two-thirds of the Alliance's annual expenditures, which total approximately \$967 billion. This year, the U.S. once again exceeded NATO's 2% of GDP target, allocating 3.4% of its GDP to defense, which amounts to around \$28.7 trillion¹⁴. In addition to direct investments, the U.S. has around 85,000 troops stationed across Europe and in other regions, such as Japan¹⁵. During the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C., in July, the U.S. formed a global coalition with Indo-Pacific partners, aiming for strategic cooperation to support Ukraine through cyber defense, combating disinformation, and technological advancements. Furthermore, the countries committed to increasing domestic defense spending to ensure rapid response capability if needed¹⁶.

In July 2024, the White House released a report detailing the current and projected contributions of the United States to NATO's deterrence and defense. U.S. actions include establishing Forward Command Posts in strategic regions

⁸ DUGGAL, Hanna. How much is each NATO country spending on its military in 2024?. **Al Jazeera**, July 11, 2024. Available at: <[https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/11/how-much-does-each-nato-country-spend-in-2024#:~:text=In%20dollar%20terms%2C%20the%20US,and%20Poland%20\(%2434.9bn\)>](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/11/how-much-does-each-nato-country-spend-in-2024#:~:text=In%20dollar%20terms%2C%20the%20US,and%20Poland%20(%2434.9bn)>)>. Accessed on: Sept 15 2024.

⁹ POLAND to spend 4% of GDP on defence this year, highest current level in NATO. **Notes from Poland**, Jan 31, 2023. Available at: <<https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/01/31/poland-to-spend-4-of-gdp-on-defence-this-year-highest-current-level-in-nato/>>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

¹⁰ *Ibid* (DUGGAL, 2024)

¹¹ Poland to be NATO's biggest defence spender this year as proportion of GDP. **Notes from Poland**, June 19, 2024. Available at: <<https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/06/19/poland-to-be-natos-biggest-defence-spender-this-year-as-proportion-of-gdp/>>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

¹² PARZONKA, Melania; VAN RIJ, Armida. Poland could be Europe's rising star on defence and security. **Chatham House**, July 19, 2024. Available at: <[>https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/07/poland-could-be-europes-rising-star-defence-and-security](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/07/poland-could-be-europes-rising-star-defence-and-security)>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

¹³ UNITED STATE EMBASSY IN POLAND. Press Statement: Second \$2 Billion U.S.-Poland Foreign Military Financing Direct Loan Strengthens NATO, 2024. Available at: <[>https://pl.usembassy.gov/press-statement-second-2-billion-u-s-poland-foreign-military-financing-direct-loan-strengthens-nato/#:~:text=Poland%20is%20a%20leader%20in,the%20highest%20in%20the%20Alliance](https://pl.usembassy.gov/press-statement-second-2-billion-u-s-poland-foreign-military-financing-direct-loan-strengthens-nato/#:~:text=Poland%20is%20a%20leader%20in,the%20highest%20in%20the%20Alliance)>. Accessed on: Sept 12 2024.

¹⁴ *Ibid* (DUGGAL, 2024)

¹⁵ UNITED STATES. FACT SHEET: United States Welcomes Growing Contributions to Global Security from NATO's Indo-Pacific Partners. **White House**, July 11, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/fact-sheet-united-states-welcomes-growing-contributions-to-global-security-from-natos-indo-pacific-partners/>>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

¹⁶ REUBEN, Anthony. How much do Nato members spend on defence?. **BBC**, July 10, 2024. Available at: <[>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074)>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

such as Poland, maintaining rotating Combat Brigades, setting up advanced air defense with more sophisticated aircraft and fighters, and making significant investments in equipment and infrastructure¹⁷. Additionally, it is important to note the potential impact of this year's U.S. presidential elections. Should Donald Trump win, investments and commitments to the Alliance may be reduced. On the other hand, if Kamala Harris wins, it is likely that she will continue the strategy adopted by her Democratic predecessor, Joe Biden.

Among NATO's top three defense investors, Estonia ranks second in terms of defense spending as a proportion of GDP, reaching 3.4% in 2024. In addition to meeting this target, Estonia has established itself as a leading country in the Alliance in its support for Ukraine. During the NATO Summit in July, Estonia pioneered an initiative to provide one million projectiles and pledged 0.25% of its annual GDP for military assistance to Ukraine¹⁸. Furthermore, in June, Estonia supplied Ukraine with missile launchers, having invested an average of €500 million in military aid in total¹⁹. Along with being a major investor, Estonia also offers key contributions, such as its Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence, which is prepared to respond to future cyberattacks.

Other countries that play a fundamental role in security matters are France and the United Kingdom. France is one of Europe's leading military powers, with well-equipped, modern armed forces and a robust global force projection capability. Currently, France is the third-largest contributor to NATO's military and civilian budgets, adhering to the organization's guidelines by allocating 2% of its GDP to defense spending and 20% to equipment acquisition²⁰. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, France's support in the Ukraine conflict has been essential for promoting Europe's security. French contributions include strengthening collective defense on the eastern flank, in Romania and Estonia, as well as conducting air and maritime patrols in the Baltic Sea, ensuring the safety of European maritime routes²¹.

However, France has experienced a period of instability in its domestic politics, which may affect its role in NATO. In June of this year, French President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the National Assembly and called for early parliamentary elections after his party's defeat by the far-right in the European Parliament elections²². Although Macron's party, the New Popular Front, won the most seats in the new elections, it did not secure an absolute majority, creating space for the growing influence of the far-right party, the National Rally. This party has openly criticized NATO, claiming it is an American organization undermining French sovereignty²³. Additionally, the National Rally receives financial support from the Russian Federation, which could lead to serious divergences in the country's national security policies²⁴. France's internal and external political instability may affect its performance in the Alliance, making

¹⁷ UNITED STATES. FACT SHEET: U.S. Contributions to NATO Deterrence and Defense. **White House**, July 11, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/11/fact-sheet-u-s-contributions-to-nato-deterrence-and-defense/>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

¹⁸ UNITED STATES. U.S. Embassy in Estonia: Estonian Minister of Defense meets with U.S. Defense Secretary. **U.S. Embassy in Estonia**, March 28, 2024. Available at: <<https://ee.usembassy.gov/2024-03-28/>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

¹⁹ ESTONIA contributes three times more than agreed in NATO to support Ukraine. **ERR News**, July 13, 2024. Available at: <<https://news.err.ee/1609396207/estonia-contributes-three-times-more-than-agreed-in-nato-to-support-ukraine>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

²⁰ FRANÇA. France and NATO. **Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Étrangères**, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/our-alliances-and-cooperations/france-and-nato/>>. Accessed on: Sept 12 2024.

²¹ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. Secretary General praises France's leading role in NATO during visit to Paris. **NATO**, June 24, 2024. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_226987.htm>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

²² O GLOBO. Entenda por que Macron convocou eleições antecipadas após vitória da extrema direita no Parlamento Europeu. **O Globo**, June 10, 2024. Available at: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2024/06/10/entenda-por-que-macron-convocou-eleicoes-antecipadas-apos-vitoria-da-extrema-direita-no-parlamento-europeu.ghtml>>. Accessed on: Sept 26 2024.

²³ FRANKE Ulrike. What France's Surprise Elections Could Mean for Its Relations with the World. **War on the Rocks**, June 28, 2024. Available at: <<https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/what-frances-surprise-elections-could-mean-for-its-relations-with-the-world/>>. Accessed on: Sept 16 2024.

²⁴ VASCONCELOS, Renato. 'Um governo Marine Le Pen seria a maior vitória que Putin poderia ter na Europa', diz deputado português. **O Globo**, June 30, 2024. Available at: <<https://oglobo.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2024/06/30/um-governo-marine-le-pen-seria-a-maior-vitoria-que-putin-poderia-ter-na-europa-diz-deputado-portugues>>.

this a scenario to watch closely.

The United Kingdom has also recently held elections, but for the position of Prime Minister. Keir Starmer is the new British Prime Minister, and during the 75th NATO Summit, he reaffirmed his commitment to supporting and investing in the Alliance's defense. The UK has one of the largest defense budgets in the region, currently allocating 2.3% of its GDP to defense, with plans to increase this percentage to 2.5% by the end of the decade. This will represent around £87 billion annually by 2030, consolidating the country as one of the top military spenders in Europe²⁵. Regarding the war in Ukraine, the UK has provided crucial support, increasing its annual military funding, which now reaches €3 billion, and supplying artillery and missile packages, along with contributing €40 million to NATO's Comprehensive Assistance Package²⁶. For the British government, supporting Ukraine is vital for the defense of both the UK and the Euro-Atlantic region.

Lastly, another country that has stood out in its contributions is Germany, one of Europe's largest economic powers, increasingly involved in security matters. This is one of the central objectives of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who is investing in more robust approaches to make Germany the largest weapons investor in Europe. For many years, Germany underinvested in its defense budget, leading to a significant lag in military strength compared to other countries on the continent. However, in 2023, German policy underwent a major transformation with the launch of the country's first comprehensive National Security Strategy. One of the key steps in the Strategy is strengthening the German armed forces (Bundeswehr), with a planned investment of €72 billion for modernizing military bases, more sophisticated weaponry, and other related initiatives²⁷.

This new strategy is signaling significant changes in the country's defense policy and in NATO, as for the first time since the 1990s, Germany met the Alliance's target of spending 2% of its GDP on defense, allocating about \$76.8 billion annually. Additionally, NATO's Secretary General thanked Germany for its leadership role within NATO, particularly for its contributions to Baltic Air Policing and for sending 12,000 troops to Steadfast Defender, NATO's largest exercise since the Cold War²⁸. However, a current concern is the future of the country's internal budget, as the National Security Strategy's financial planning for the Special Fund is only outlined until 2027²⁹. Germany's present challenge is to ensure that the promised investments to NATO are maintained, avoiding cuts in other government sectors³⁰.

[le-pen-seria-a-maior-vitoria-que-putin-poderia-ter-na-europa-diz-deputado-portugues.ghtml](#)>. Accessed on: Sept 26 2024.

²⁵ BOSCIA, Stefan. UK's Keir Starmer urges allies to hike defense spending. Politico, July 9, 2024. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-keir-starmer-prime-minister-nato-members-summit-us-elections-defense-spending/>. Accessed on: Sept 17 2024.

²⁶ UNITED KINGDOM. UK to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes, PM to tell NATO. GOV.UK, July 10, 2024. Available at:

²⁷ Will Germany deliver on its grand military ambitions?. Financial Times, February 15, 2024. Available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/51cf54ed-55df-4369-bdef-6f98be17d26c>>. Accessed on: Sept 17 2024.

²⁸ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. NATO Secretary General in Berlin: Germany makes major contributions to our shared security. NATO, April 26, 2024. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_225068.htm>. Accessed on: Sept 17 2024.

²⁹ KONERTZ, Martin. The challenge ahead for Germany's armed forces. European Security and Defence. April 23, 2024. Available at: <https://euro-sd.com/2024/04/articles/37547/the-challenge-ahead-for-germanys-armed-forces/>>. Accessed on: Sept 17 2024.

³⁰ SCHUTZ, Torben; Molling Christian. Germany's Defense Budget 2024: The Planned Increase Is Not Yet Enough. German Council on Foreign Relations. July 2023. Available at: <https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/germanys-defense-budget-2024>>. Accessed on: Sept 17 2024.

3.2. Analysis of the political and military strength of NATO's middle powers

Medium powers can be defined as countries that contribute proportionally to NATO, whether financially or through support with equipment or personnel. In this context, several important countries stand out due to their political, military, and territorial relevance. Turkey is an example of this concept, currently playing a prominent role as a mediator in peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. This positioning arises primarily from Turkey's ambivalent relationship with both the West and Russia. Currently, Turkey is one of the largest buyers of Russian crude oil and is becoming increasingly crucial for transporting Russian natural gas through the TurkStream pipeline, which is on the verge of becoming Russia's only export route to the European Union³¹.

Although this relationship with Russia is uncomfortable for many NATO members, it enables Turkey to play a crucial role in mediating agreements with the Russian government, such as the Black Sea grain deal and prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and Russia³². Turkey is important to NATO, possessing the Alliance's second-largest army and a well-developed arms industry³³. Additionally, its strategic location on the Black Sea, controlling the Bosphorus Strait - one of the main maritime routes for European international trade - further reinforces its relevance. All these factors give President Erdoğan bargaining power with NATO members, negotiating better deals and concessions for both sides.

Similarly, Spain has actively supported NATO military operations, with its primary contribution being the mobilization of its Armed Forces in missions, both aerial, with its jets on patrol, and naval, with its ships integrating the Alliance fleet. However, in terms of defense spending, the country has fallen short of expectations. In 2024, Spain ranked last in defense spending as a proportion of GDP, contributing only 1.28%³⁴. At the NATO Summit in Madrid in 2022, the Spanish government promised to meet the 2% of GDP target by 2029, which would double its military spending budget to €26 billion³⁵. However, this goal is becoming a challenge due to Spain's fragmented politics and high levels of debt. Nevertheless, Spain argues that it compensates for its low financial investments with active military participation in NATO missions³⁶.

In contrast, Iceland, the only NATO country without its own armed forces, remains a vital member for the security of Europe and North America. A founding member of NATO, Iceland has historically contributed to collective defense mainly by providing strategic military facilities due to its crucial geographic location between oceans³⁷. Although it does not have an army, the country has played an important role through financial contributions, such as ISK 3 million in support, and by providing military training and assisting in the transport of supplies and military

³¹ BECHEV, Dimitar. Closer Ties to the West Don't Mean Turkey Will Give Up On Russia. Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. February 7, 2024. Available at: <<https://carnegieendowment.org/russia- Eurasia/politika/2024/02/closer-ties-to-the-west-dont-mean-turkey-will-give-up-on-russia?lang=en>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

³² TURAK, Natasha. Turkey is back in from the cold with NATO and F-16 moves, but thorny issues remain. CNBC. February 21, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/21/turkey-is-back-in-from-the-cold-with-nato-and-f-16-moves.html>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

³³ SCHOSSLER, Alexandre. Turquia, o complicado aliado do Ocidente na Otan. DW. April 4, 2023. Available at: <<https://www.dw.com/pt-br/turquia-o-complicado-aliado-do-ocidente-na-otan/a-65226957#:~:text=A%20Turquia%20tamb%C3%A9m%20tem%20o,qual%20armas%20nucleares%20est%C3%A3o%20estacionadas>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

³⁴ BERNARD, Andrew. Dispatch from Madrid: For Spain's contributions to NATO, look beyond its defense spending. Atlantic Council. Juli 9, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dispatch-from-madrid-spains-defense-spending-low-but-its-military-tempo-paints-a-different-picture/>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

³⁵ WILSON, Joseph. Spain boosts military spending to close gap with NATO goal. The Associated Press. July 5, 2022. Available at: <<https://apnews.com/article/nato-russia-ukraine-spain-eastern-europe-madrid-61f2e9644404358defb517dcd37a2170>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

³⁶ FINANCIAL TIMES. Why Spain is Nato's laggard on defence spending. Financial Times. July 8, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.ft.com/content/5803ccb4-5d49-4331-bdbf-100d15cd6526>>. Accessed on Sept 18 2024.

³⁷ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. Iceland and NATO. NATO. Available at: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162083.htm#:~:text=Iceland%20is%20the%20only%20Ally,the%20Alliance%20until%20the%201990s>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

equipment³⁸. More recently, Iceland, along with the Nordic countries, supported the 2023 Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine (G7 Declaration), agreeing to provide military, economic, and humanitarian assistance, as well as initiating bilateral security negotiations with Ukraine³⁹.

⁴⁰Another notable Nordic country is Norway, whose primary role in NATO is to defend and deter potential Russian attacks from the northern flank, while maintaining leverage for productive bilateral relations with Russia. Due to the conflict in Ukraine, Norway has been increasing its defense spending, proposing a historic increase of NOK 1.6 billion by 2036. These measures are part of the "New Norwegian Long Term Plan," aimed at strategically, logistically, and operationally boosting the Norwegian Armed Forces. Norway is currently focused on defending its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, leading to increased investments in submarines, anti-submarine weapons, mines, and unmanned systems. Additionally, Norway has been investing heavily in intelligence to expand its monitoring capabilities, including the use of advanced drones by the air force to ensure more efficient coverage. This security strategy is being strengthened by the growing integration of armed forces among the Nordic countries, especially with Finland and Sweden, which recently joined NATO. This new alliance is making the Nordic region much better prepared to face potential threats.

⁴¹In 2023, Finland and Sweden officially became members of NATO, consolidating themselves as important allies for Europe's protection amid the war in Ukraine. For many years, both countries maintained a position of neutrality in international politics, with Finland adopting this stance out of pragmatism and protectionism, while Sweden did so for identity reasons, given its role in promoting world peace. However, the current international scenario has imposed new security needs for these states. The process of both countries joining NATO required extensive negotiations, particularly because Turkey maintained a hostile stance toward Sweden's entry. Turkey alleged that these countries supported terrorist organizations, focusing on the PKK, a Kurdish militant group with separatist leanings. This impasse was resolved in 2023 with the update of Sweden's anti-terrorism laws, which became stricter regarding extremist groups.

Both countries are important for maintaining security. Finland has a highly trained army, with 280,000 soldiers, and in 2024 already met the 2% of GDP defense spending target, registering an investment of 2.3%⁴². Sweden, on the other hand, also reached 2.1% of its GDP in defense spending, with a well-equipped army, featuring modern defense systems and advanced technology. The defense focus of these countries is the Baltic Sea, an important region that hosts pipelines and underwater infrastructure⁴³. Additionally, both have been increasing investments in their air forces, signing agreements with other Nordic countries for the acquisition of aircraft, fighter jets, and advanced communication technologies⁴⁴. The combination of each country's technologies and strategic location enhances NATO's power and makes the war in Ukraine increasingly complex to predict in terms of potential outcomes for the international system if it escalates.

³⁸ ICELAND. Ministry for Foreign Affairs. War in Ukraine - Iceland's response. Government of Iceland. Available at: <<https://www.government.is/topics/foreign-affairs/war-in-ukraine/>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

³⁹ UKRAINE. Office of the President. Agreement on Security Cooperation and Long-Term Support between Ukraine and Iceland. President of Ukraine. May 31, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ugoda-pro-spivrobitnictvo-u-sferi-bezpeki-ta-dovgostrokovu-p-91237>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

⁴⁰ FEDINA, Katja; EKEN, Mattias, BLACK, James. Evolving Norway's Role in the NATO Alliance. RAND. July 29, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/07/evolving-norways-role-in-the-nato-alliance.html>>. Accessed on: Sept 18 2024.

⁴¹ CHATTERJEE, Phelan. How Sweden and Finland went from neutral to NATO. BBC. July 11, 2023. Available at: <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61397478>>. Accessed on: Sept 19 2024.

⁴² MOYER, Jason. Finland's Remarkable First Year in NATO. Wilson Center. April 3, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/finlands-remarkable-first-year-nato>>. Accessed on: Sept 19, 2024.

⁴³ MACKENZIE, Lucia. What Sweden brings to NATO. Politico. March 7, 2024. Available at: <<https://www.politico.eu/article/sweden-nato-membership-military-power/>>. Accessed on: Sept 19 2024.

⁴⁴ MILITAIRE SPECTATOR. A safer Europe: 'Finland and Sweden join NATO as contributors'. Militaire Spectator. October 17, 2022. Available at: <<https://militairespectator.nl/artikelen/safer-europe-finland-and-sweden-join-nato-contributors>> Accessed on: Sep 19 2024.

4 CHALLENGES AND COOPERATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY CAPACITY

The scenario established by the conflict in Ukraine has posed new challenges to global military capabilities, especially with regard to international cooperation to support the country's defense effort. Cooperation among NATO member states in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict faces significant challenges, reflecting issues of strategic alignment, defense capabilities, and the complex relationship between national interests and collective commitments. This picture becomes even more complex when considering NATO's historical role in strengthening security in Eastern Europe and the impact of the conflict on the global security architecture.

There is growing pressure on European countries to increase defense spending, especially given NATO's stance toward Russia. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been a push for members to increase their defense capabilities, which is essential to maintain a collective deterrent posture against external threats. However, this increase in spending faces internal obstacles, such as divergent economic and domestic political priorities among the Alliance members.

As a consequence of this divergence in each country's agenda, cooperation in providing military assistance to Ukraine is marked by disparities. This becomes evident when we realize that despite the creation of specific funds by the European Union, such as the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the Ukraine Facility, to assist Kiev, much of the assistance is provided bilaterally, with some countries such as Poland, the United Kingdom, and Germany playing central roles. The EPF, for instance, allows EU member states to deliver military aid to partner countries through a dedicated €5.6 billion fund, providing critical systems and ammunition for Ukraine's defense. Meanwhile, the Ukraine Facility, a €50 billion fund, is intended to support Ukraine's recovery, modernization, and the reforms associated with its potential EU accession between 2024 and 2027. However, despite these collective mechanisms, the reliance on bilateral aid reflects the differing levels of commitment and capacity among NATO allies, underscoring the influence of individual agendas on the coherence of support provided.

Powerful and influential countries such as the United States and Germany play an extremely important role in this scenario, leading the coalition supporting Ukraine with significant financial and military contributions. Washington has not only provided advanced defense systems but has also facilitated the mobilization of international resources through its diplomatic influence. For the United States, support involves both leadership in coordinating military assistance and financial responsibility, as the country leads in sending resources and armaments. However, Washington faces a growing challenge of "war fatigue" among its allies and within Congress itself. Meanwhile, Germany, despite being an economic powerhouse within the European Union, faces logistical and political limitations. Historically reluctant to adopt aggressive military postures due to its post-World War II foreign policy, the country has struggled to rapidly increase its defense budget and allocate resources to meet Kyiv's urgent needs. Additionally, Germany faces domestic pressures regarding energy security after decades of dependence on Russian gas, making support for Ukraine a delicate issue internally.

It is also important to understand how the so-called "middle powers" behave in this context of support within the European Union. Looking at Spain, for example, we see that it contributes with military and humanitarian assistance but faces budget constraints and internal political pressures that make increasing this support difficult. Furthermore, there is a divide in public opinion and among political leaders regarding the level of involvement in the conflict, especially concerning the supply of more advanced weapons, which limits the government's flexibility to increase its contribution without compromising its own domestic stability. Norway, with a border adjacent to Russia and a strategic NATO member, plays a key role in regional security, providing financial and military aid to Ukraine, as well as being an important alternative energy source for Europe. However, Norway's geographical proximity to Russia imposes a delicate diplomatic challenge, as it needs to balance support for Ukraine with the necessity of avoiding direct escalation with Moscow. This context leads Norway to adopt a cautious stance in its actions, aiming not to compromise regional

security in the Arctic, where cooperation with Russia remains necessary in some areas.

In addition to the economic and political challenges, the military cooperation within NATO and the EU is complicated by divergent defense capabilities among member states. While countries like the United States and the United Kingdom have advanced military technologies, large defense budgets, and extensive global military commitments, other NATO allies, particularly in Southern and Eastern Europe, are still in the process of modernizing their armed forces. This disparity in military readiness leads to uneven contributions to the Ukraine conflict, with some countries able to provide state-of-the-art weapons systems, while others focus on more basic forms of assistance, such as logistical support or training. This variation in capability can create tensions within the alliance, as some members may feel that others are not contributing enough or that the burden of defence spending is not being shared equitably. Furthermore, NATO's need to balance its defense commitments to Ukraine with its broader responsibilities in other regions, including the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, adds complexity to the strategic decisions facing the alliance.

The evolving nature of the conflict also raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of the support provided to Ukraine. While the initial response from NATO and the EU was swift, as the conflict drags on, questions about the limits of military aid, the exhaustion of stockpiles, and the increasing financial burden on supporting countries are coming near to become weaknesses to the states parties. As the war enters a prolonged phase, some countries may begin to appraise their level of engagement, particularly as they confront the economic realities of continuous military support. There is a growing concern about the impact of the conflict on global supply chains, energy prices, and internal political stability. This could further strain the willingness of certain member states to commit the necessary resources, especially if domestic concerns begin to surpass foreign policy priorities. The risk of a "fatigue effect" not only in the United States but also within European capitals could undermine the unity of the international coalition supporting Ukraine, leading to calls for greater diplomatic engagement or a shift toward alternative form of conflict resolution. Thus, NATO and the EU will need to not only maintain military support but also address the economic, diplomatic, and political challenges to ensure that the international community remains committed to Ukraine's defense in the long term.

5. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

According to the NATO-Ukraine Council's declaration marking two years since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukrainian territory, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine's cause, committing to this support for as long as necessary to ensure its success. NATO is dedicated to providing assistance and strengthening and rebuilding Ukraine's defense and security sector.

In order to deepen the relations between NATO and Ukraine, the allied countries continue to provide financial backing for Ukraine's war effort. With a pledge of €40 billion between 2024 and 2025, including the provision of F-16 fighter jets and air defense support, NATO aims for greater integration with Ukraine's armed forces.

The Organization's continued stance of supporting Ukraine, alongside its firm condemnation of Russia's aggression, underscores the commitment of NATO members to strengthen the relationship between the alliance and the Eastern European nation. Thus, when the conditions are met and agreement is reached among its members, NATO leaders have reaffirmed their intention to invite Ukraine to join the alliance.

NATO also maintains that Russia's invasion of Ukrainian territory is illegal, unprovoked, and unjustifiable. Recognizing that the Russian action disrupts Euro-Atlantic and global security and stability, as well as representing a clear violation of international law, NATO demands the immediate cessation of Russian hostilities, the end of the war, and the withdrawal of Russian forces.

6. CONCLUSION

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has undoubtedly reshaped the strategic landscape of Europe and the broader international security framework. NATO and the European Union have emerged as central players in the defense of Ukraine, navigating a complex web of military, economic, and political challenges. Despite the substantial financial and military contributions from key NATO members, such as the United States and Germany, there remains significant divergence among allied states in terms of defense capabilities, domestic priorities, and the political will to sustain long-term support. These disparities have led to a reliance on bilateral aid and a fragmentation in the collective response, raising questions about the future coherence of the alliance.

The pressure on European nations to increase defense spending, in light of the evolving threats posed by Russia, has highlighted both the importance and the difficulties of maintaining a united front. While NATO's commitment to Ukraine remains firm, internal challenges—ranging from budgetary constraints to divergent political agendas—risk weakening the cohesion and effectiveness of the alliance. As military support from Western nations becomes increasingly strained, particularly in the face of growing "war fatigue," the future of this cooperation may depend not only on the continuation of financial and military assistance but also on the development of diplomatic solutions that can address the root causes of the conflict and contribute to a sustainable peace.

Looking ahead, the relationship between NATO and Ukraine is poised for further development, with potential future integration into the alliance being a key objective. However, for NATO to effectively manage the tensions within its own ranks and sustain its support for Ukraine, it will need to balance military assistance with economic and diplomatic engagement. The evolving dynamics of the conflict call for a multifaceted approach, one that can ensure continued commitment from member states while navigating the broader implications of the war on global stability and security. Only through sustained cooperation, strategic alignment, and a commitment to shared values can the international community hope to secure a lasting peace and safeguard the future of Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

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ANÁLISE DO ACORDO DE LIVRE COMÉRCIO ENTRE MERCOSUL E UNIÃO EUROPEIA

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Hiran Ricardo⁴⁶

Nicole Bolzan Streibel⁴⁷

RESUMO

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o acordo de livre comércio entre o Mercosul e a União Europeia, destacando o contexto histórico das negociações e os principais desafios enfrentados. A pesquisa também explora os impactos econômicos e políticos dessa parceria, que reforça a posição do Mercosul no cenário internacional e amplia a influência da UE na América Latina. Por fim, discute-se as perspectivas futuras para a cooperação entre os blocos, buscando entender os potenciais benefícios desta parceria. Conclui-se que o futuro do acordo é incerto, devido à falta de consenso interno na UE e ao ceticismo crescente no Mercosul.

1 INTRODUCTION

A interação econômica entre os países é uma dinâmica imprescindível no sistema internacional contemporâneo. No contexto do acordo de livre comércio entre Mercosul e União Europeia (UE), as negociações representam um marco significativo nas relações, não somente pelo potencial econômico, mas também sobre as relações políticas da parceria. Dessa maneira, a crescente interdependência econômica entre os Estados fornece base para novos acordos comerciais, expandindo o comércio internacional. Vale lembrar que o acordo entre os blocos não é um tema recente, o processo começou na década de 90, evidenciando a complexidade das negociações.

Além do âmbito econômico, o acordo representa ao Mercosul a reafirmação da sua importância no sistema internacional. Para a UE, traz vantagens econômicas na área inter-regional, projetando sua influência econômica para os países do Cone Sul. De acordo com o Governo do Brasil, “Juntos, Mercosul e UE representam 1/4 da economia mundial. A UE é o segundo parceiro comercial do Mercosul e o primeiro em matéria de investimentos. O Mercosul é o oitavo principal parceiro comercial extrarregional da UE”⁴⁸.

Dessa maneira, este artigo tem como objetivo explorar o acordo Mercosul-União Europeia. Será analisado o contexto histórico de criação dos blocos, assim como do acordo. Ademais, o estudo contemplará o impacto do acordo e as possíveis perspectivas futuras.

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⁴⁶ Graduando em Relações Internacionais na Universidade La Salle.

⁴⁷ Graduanda em Relações Internacionais na Universidade La Salle.

⁴⁸ BRASIL. **Mercosul e União Europeia firmam acordo de livre comércio; veja nota oficial. 2022.**

Disponível em <<https://www.gov.br/agricultura/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/mercosul-e-uniao-europeia-firmam-acordo-de-livre-comercio-veja-nota-oficial>>. Acesso em 19. Ago. 2024.

2 MERCOSUL

O Mercado Comum do Sul, ou Mercosul, é um bloco econômico regional, composto pelos membros Argentina, Brasil, Paraguai, Uruguai e Venezuela⁴⁹. O objetivo principal do bloco é a união das economias membros no sistema internacional, proporcionando um espaço propício para trocas comerciais e de investimentos. De acordo com o World Economic Outlook Database - FMI é a 5º maior economia do mundo em 2014⁵⁰. O bloco foi formado em 26 de Março de 1991, pelo Tratado de Assunção que definiu um programa de liberalização comercial de todo tema alfandegário.

O Mercosul foi uma reação do Brasil, Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai em busca de alternativas políticas e econômicas diante do cenário dos anos 90 de liberalização econômica, crise econômica e mudanças políticas em todo o globo. O objetivo era preparar o Cone Sul para um contexto comercial muito mais competitivo, impulsionado pela globalização. Além disso, buscavam uma maior autonomia no cenário internacional

FIGURA 1 - Mapa dos membros principais do Mercosul



Fonte: Mercosul⁵¹

2.1 Processo de integração e funcionamento

Apesar do nome ser Mercado Comum, o processo de integração do Mercosul não chegou nesse estado. O bloco está no grau de União Aduaneira (UA), que consiste em um estágio avançado de integração econômica. Nesse processo, os países membros eliminam tarifas e de outras barreiras de comércio e bens, negociam uma Tarifa Externa Comum e adotam uma política comercial comum.

Dessa maneira, os países cedem parte da sua soberania econômica em prol do bloco, ou seja, as negociações comerciais são coordenadas entre os membros. Dentro de um sistema como o Mercosul, os acordos coordenados são importantes para manter a coesão do bloco e para garantir que o objetivo seja alcançado de maneira unificada. Ademais, com a coordenação do bloco os países podem ter mais vantagens no sistema internacional, como exemplo o maior poder de barganha, escala, estabilidade de preços e eficiência.

⁴⁹ A República Bolivariana da Venezuela está suspensa de todos os direitos e obrigações como Estado Parte do Mercosul.

⁵⁰ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. **World Economic Outlook Databases 2014**. Disponível em: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending>. Acesso em: 30 de Ago. de 2024.

⁵¹ MERCOSUL. O que é o Mercosul?. Disponível em: <https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/quem-somos/em-poucas-palavras/>. Acesso em: 30 de Ago. de 2024.

Além disso, como citado anteriormente, o Mercosul busca estabelecer negócios mais integrados e competitivos. O bloco busca estabelecer parcerias e acordos com outros países e blocos econômicos em todo sistema, para expandir suas oportunidades comerciais e fortalecer a presença global como bloco.

2.2 Órgãos e Decisões

O Mercosul, conta com mais de 300 foros de negociação e, como menciona o próprio site,

Toma suas decisões mediante três órgãos: o Conselho do Mercado Comum (CMC), órgão superior do MERCOSUL, que conduz politicamente o processo de integração, o Grupo Mercado Comum (GMC), que vela pelo funcionamento cotidiano do bloco, e a Comissão de Comércio (CCM), incumbida da administração dos instrumentos comuns de política comercial.⁵²

De acordo com o Mercosul, as decisões e procedimento para vigências das normas são realizadas da seguinte forma:

- **Aprovação:** A norma é aprovada pelo órgão decisório através de consenso entre os membros.
- **Ordenamento Interno:** Cada Estado Parte realiza a incorporação da norma em seu sistema jurídico nacional.
- **Negociação e Adesão:** O Grupo Mercado Comum (GMC) conduz negociações sobre as condições e termos de adesão com o país que deseja aderir, com o auxílio de um Grupo formado por representantes do país aderente e dos Estados Parte. E as conclusões dessas negociações são submetidas ao Conselho do Mercado Comum (CMC) para aprovação final.
- **Notificação da Incorporação:** Uma vez que todos os Estados Parte tenham completado a incorporação da norma, a Secretaria do Mercosul é responsável por notificar oficialmente essa conclusão.
- **Início da Vigência:** A norma começa a vigorar simultaneamente 30 dias após a comunicação feita pela Secretaria aos membros.

8. UNIÃO EUROPEIA

A União Europeia (UE) é um bloco econômico e político composto por 27 membros. O objetivo principal é promover a integração econômica e política. Além disso, a UE busca promover a paz, seus valores e o bem-estar de seus cidadãos. Ela visa estabelecer um mercado interno competitivo, além de fomentar a coesão econômica e social entre seus membros. No cenário internacional, a UE se compromete a promover seus valores, contribuir para a paz global, erradicar a pobreza e proteger os direitos humanos⁵³. Atualmente, a UE abrange 14% da economia de mercadorias mundiais⁵⁴.

O bloco foi formalmente estabelecido em 1993, com a entrada em vigor do Tratado de Maastricht, que expandiu as bases da cooperação econômica para abranger também áreas políticas e sociais. A formação da União Europeia pode ser entendida como uma resposta ao cenário político e econômico do pós-guerra, que impulsionou os países europeus a buscarem formas de garantir a paz e estabilidade através da integração. O bloco também visava posicionar a Europa

⁵² MERCOSUL. Funcionamento. Disponível em: <<https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/quem-somos/em-poucas-palavras/>>. Acesso em: 30 de Ago. de 2024.

⁵³ Objetivos e valores. União Europeia. Disponível em: <https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_pt>. Acesso em: 23 Set. 2024.

⁵⁴ Factos e números sobre a União Europeia. União Europeia. Disponível em: <https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/facts-and-figures-european-union_pt>. Acesso em: 23 Set. 2024.

como uma potência relevante no cenário internacional.

FIGURA 2 - Mapa dos membros da União Europeia



Fonte: União Europeia

8. Processo de Integração e Funcionamento

A União Europeia possui um alto grau de integração, tendo alcançado o grau de União Econômica e Monetária (UEM), que é a última etapa antes de uma união política ou uma federação de Estados. Nesse nível de integração, os membros eliminam barreiras tarifárias e aduaneiras e compartilham uma moeda única, entretanto nem todos os países membros aderiram à união monetária. Além disso, adotam políticas comuns em diversas áreas, ou seja, isso significa uma concessão de soberania para as instituições da UE.

Dentro desse sistema, as políticas são coordenadas de forma supranacional, de modo que os países atuam de maneira coordenada no cenário internacional. A União Europeia tem um grande poder de barganha no sistema internacional, garantindo vantagens competitivas. Ademais, a UE mantém uma variedade de parceiros econômicos com outros blocos e países ao redor do mundo, fortalecendo sua presença global e ampliando suas oportunidades comerciais.

7.1 Órgãos e Decisões

A União Europeia conta com diversas instituições que tomam decisões sobre as políticas do bloco. Entre os principais órgãos estão:

- **Conselho Europeu:** Define as orientações políticas gerais e as prioridades da UE. É composto pelos chefes de Estado ou de governo dos países-membros.
- **Comissão Europeia:** Representa os interesses comuns e é responsável pela execução das políticas e administração cotidiana da UE, além de propor novas legislações.
- **Parlamento Europeu:** Órgão legislativo da UE, composto por deputados eleitos diretamente pelos cidadãos dos países-membros. Participa na aprovação das leis e do orçamento do bloco.
- **Conselho da União Europeia:** Representa os governos dos Estados-membros e, juntamente com o Parlamento, adota legislação e coordenações políticas.

As decisões na UE são tomadas por meio de consenso entre os países-membros e votação qualificada⁵⁵. Para as normas e políticas entrarem em vigor, elas devem ser analisadas, uma vez que a Comissão Europeia propõe uma nova legislação, que é discutida e aprovada tanto pelo Parlamento Europeu quanto pelo Conselho da União Europeia. Logo, os países-membros devem incorporar a norma ao seu sistema jurídico interno.

5. HISTÓRICO DO ACORDO

A União Europeia e o Mercosul chegaram a um acordo político em 28 de Junho de 2019. Sendo negociado desde 1999, o acordo prevê a consolidação de relações políticas e econômicas mais profundas entre os blocos. Cobrindo aproximadamente 780 milhões de pessoas e 25% da economia mundial, a negociação resultará na criação de uma das maiores áreas de livre comércio no planeta.

Negociações sobre redução de tarifas e área de livre comércio, que ocorrem entre os blocos desde 1999, iniciaram-se com o estabelecimento de um cronograma no mesmo ano. Em 2001 são criados grupos de trabalho para dar início às conversas sobre os temas pertinentes ao acordo⁵⁶.

Apesar do avanço das conversas no início do século, o entrave maior está na questão agrícola. Os preços de produtos produzidos no Mercosul eram mais competitivos e representavam uma ameaça à política agrícola comum (PAC) europeia, dessa forma, uma redução de tarifas seria prejudicial aos produtores europeus, principalmente franceses⁵⁷.

Em 2004 as negociações foram paralisadas. Isso ocorre devido à proposta apresentada pela União Europeia não atender à expectativa dos países do Mercosul em relação à agropecuária. Somado a isso, a inserção chinesa no mercado global e o reposicionamento brasileiro no comércio Sul-Sul, removeram o acordo dos temas prioritários.

O cenário pós-crise de 2008, com o aumento do protecionismo e dúvidas sobre o futuro da OMC, resultou na retomada das negociações em 2012 e avanços só ocorreram em 2016. As políticas de liberalização econômica perpetradas por Brasil e Argentina, a inserção chinesa e o protecionismo americano do final da década de 2010, representou um cenário de ganhos favoráveis para a União Europeia estabelecer um acordo com o Mercosul, resultando no acordo político em 2019⁵⁸.


⁵⁵ De acordo com o Conselho Europeu, “a maioria qualificada é alcançada se estiverem reunidas simultaneamente duas condições: **55 % dos Estados-Membros** votaram a favor – o que corresponde, na prática, a 15 dos 27 países e a proposta é apoiada por Estados-Membros que representem, no mínimo, **65 % da população total da UE**”.

⁵⁶ SAVINI, Marcos. As negociações entre Mercosul e União Europeia. Primeira Instância. **Rev. bras. polít. int.**, v. 44, n. 2, dez. 2001. Disponível em: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292001000200006>

⁵⁷ SAVINI, Marcos. As negociações entre Mercosul e União Europeia. Primeira Instância. **Rev. bras. polít. int.**, v. 44, n. 2, dez. 2001. Disponível em: <https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-73292001000200006>

⁵⁸ VALLS PEREIRA, Lia Baker. Acordo Mercosul-União Europeia: o que esperar? **FGV IBRE**. Ago 2019. Disponível em: <https://blogdoibre.fgv.br/posts/acordo-mercosul-uniao-europeia-o-que-esperar>

Linha do tempo:



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8. Objetivos

O acordo Mercosul-União Europeia possui três pilares: diálogo político, cooperação e livre comércio⁶⁰. O acordo de comércio entre-blocos representa uma relação de ganhos para ambos as partes, com oportunidades de crescimento, emprego e desenvolvimento sustentável.

Os objetivos do acordo são:

- Aumentar comércio e investimentos bilaterais e reduzir barreiras tarifárias e não-tarifárias, principalmente para empresas de pequeno e médio porte;
- Criar regras mais estáveis e previsíveis para comércio e investimento, por exemplo, nas áreas de propriedade intelectual, padrões de segurança de alimentos, competitividade e práticas regulatórias;
- Promover valores conjuntos como desenvolvimento sustentável, fortalecimento de direitos trabalhistas, combate às mudanças climáticas, aumento de proteção ambiental, encorajar a responsabilidade corporativa e a padronização da qualidade de alimentos⁶¹.

⁵⁹ BRASIL. Acordo de associação Mercosul-União Europeia. Jul 2019. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/arquivos/documentos/politica-externa-comercial-e-economica/2019_10_24_Resumo_Acordo_Mercosul_UE_CGNCE.pdf

⁶⁰ BRASIL. Acordo de associação Mercosul-União Europeia. Jul 2019. Disponível em: https://www.gov.br/mre/pt-br/arquivos/documentos/politica-externa-comercial-e-economica/2019_10_24_Resumo_Acordo_Mercosul_UE_CGNCE.pdf

⁶¹ EUROPEAN COMMISSION. EU-Mercosur trade agreement. Jun 2019. Disponível em: https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercador/eu-mercador-agreement_en

7.1 Principais Disposições e Áreas

O acordo comercial entre Mercosul e União Europeia dispõe sobre diversas áreas, de comércio, resolução de controvérsias, integração regional e cooperação. Entre as principais, encontram-se os temas listados⁶².

- Comércio de Bens
 - Estabelece uma área de livre comércio entre Mercosul e União Europeia. Disciplina temas de comércio entre os blocos, como importação e exportação, tarifas, tratamento nacional, empresas estatais, bens reparados, entre outros.
- Regras de Origem
 - Estabelece normativa que garante que as partes sejam os reais beneficiários de operações econômicas. Define arcabouço que previne e combate irregularidades e fraudes na obtenção de tratamento tarifário preferencial.
- Facilitação de Comércio
 - Dispõe sobre compromissos como transparência, cooperação entre autoridades aduaneiras, gestão de risco, entre outros métodos existentes em diversas áreas que contribuam para facilitar as oportunidades da área de livre comércio.
- Pequenas e Médias Empresas
 - Compreende o impacto que barreiras não tarifárias têm sobre micro, pequenas e médias empresas (MPEs), e reconhecendo a importância dessas empresas para o crescimento econômico, procura estabelecer medidas de apoio às MPMEs, especialmente a internacionalização.
- Serviços
 - Alinhados com as diretrizes da OMC, os compromissos sobre investimentos e comércio de serviços buscam evitar a discriminação de prestadores de serviços e investidores estrangeiros, assim como a imposição de barreiras quantitativas à entrada desses prestadores e investidores.
- Compras Governamentais
 - Garante maior concorrência e acesso às licitações públicas domésticas, assim como a incorporação de padrões internacionais na área de transparência.
- Propriedade Intelectual
 - Reafirma padrões internacionais de propriedade intelectual. Reconhece, como nova medida, indicações geográficas.
- Empresas Estatais

⁶² BRASIL. **Mercosul-União Europeia**. Mar 2022. Disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/siscomex/pt-br/acordos-comerciais/mercosul-uniao-europeia>

- Busca garantir que empresas públicas atuem com base em considerações comerciais e deixem de atuar, sempre que necessário, para cumprir suas responsabilidades e objetivos públicos.
- Solução de Controvérsias
 - Amplia os mecanismos de para a resolução de disputas comerciais entre os blocos.
- Comércio e Desenvolvimento Sustentável
 - As partes do acordo reiteram o compromisso com os acordos multilaterais relacionados ao meio ambiente, assim como proteção aos direitos trabalhistas e povos originários.
- Barreiras Técnicas ao Comércio
 - Estabelece dispositivos que vão além dos compromissos assumidos na OMC no que diz respeito a regulamentos técnicos, normas de conformidade, entre outros.
- Defesa Comercial e Salvaguardas Bilaterais
 - Prevê mecanismos multilaterais de defesa comercial, como *antidumping*, medidas compensatórias e salvaguardas bilaterais.

8. POSIÇÃO DOS PAÍSES MEMBROS

7.1 Mercosul

Argentina - Segundo o ministério da economia o estado argentino tem buscado firmar o acordo devido a evidências positivas na economia de países do sul global que tem relações comerciais diretas com a União Europeia. Segundo o ministério: “O acordo criará grandes oportunidades comerciais para as empresas argentinas”.⁶³ Além disso, a UE é o segundo maior comprador de suas exportações totalizando 9.000 milhões de dólares ao ano e o maior investidor direto estrangeiro. Porém o atual governo de Milei tem sido crítico ao Mercosul e tem faltado reuniões sobre o acordo.

Brasil - Segundo o governo este acordo é: “Assunto de primeira importância para o Brasil no cenário internacional”⁶⁴ e foi publicado um estudo do IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada) sobre o acordo que prevê um aumento de 0,46% no PIB brasileiro entre 2024 e 2040.⁶⁵ Também foi calculado que seria mais vantajoso para o estado Brasileiro que para outros integrantes do Mercosul e países europeus.

⁶³ UNIÓN EUROPEA, **Argentina.gob.ar**, disponível em: <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/produccion/acuerdos-internacionales/conoce/tlc/suscritos/ue> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024 .

⁶⁴ NEGOCIAÇÕES PARA ACORDO UNIÃO EUROPEIA-MERCOSUL SEGUEM COM APOIO AMPLO DO GOVERNO BRASILEIRO, **gov.br**, disponível em: <https://www.gov.br/secom/pt-br/fatos/brasil-contrafake/noticias/2024/negociacoes-para-acordo-uniao-europeia-mercossul-seguem-com-apoio-amplo-do-governo-brasileiro> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

⁶⁵ ACORDO DE LIVRE COMÉRCIO ENTRE MERCOSUL E UNIÃO EUROPEIA TRARIA BENEFÍCIOS ECONÔMICOS PARA O BRASIL, **gov.br**, disponível em: <https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/categorias/45-todas-as-noticias/noticias/14875-acordo-de-livre-comercio-entre-mercossul-e-uniao-europeia-traria-beneficios-economicos-para-o-brasil> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

Uruguai - Tem como objetivo diversificar mercado de exportação, dependendo menos das compras chinesas e realizar mais exportações com amparo de um acordo comercial, no fechamento do acordo 47% das exportações estarão sujeitas a benefícios em comparação com 31% atuais.⁶⁶

Paraguai - O acordo ajudará o país em seu plano de transformação da matriz energética com o impulsionamento do PIB, pretende negociar exclusivamente com o mercado europeu 10.000.000 Kg de açúcar orgânico com tarifa 0% ⁶⁷ e também a importação de peças para automóveis será facilitada com o acordo. O presidente Santiago Peña tem sido crítico ao comportamento europeu e está cético quanto a firmação do acordo, ele pretende encerrar as negociações entre os blocos para focar no diálogo com os países asiáticos quando o Paraguai assumir a presidência do Mercosul⁶⁸

7.2 União Europeia

Alemanha - Segundo o governo federal da república alemã, o país quer firmar o acordo em breve⁶⁹ e ressalta as vantagens para a economia do país que é focada na exportação e atualmente está em declínio devido ao impacto das sanções feitas a Rússia pela invasão à Ucrânia. O acordo proposto em 2019, ainda segue sem aprovação devido a falta de políticas ambientais apesar da pressão do governo que pretende aquecer sua economia novamente.

Áustria - A gestão do governo está dividida internamente, com partes lutando para ratificar o acordo e vendo os efeitos positivos do tratado enquanto o setor de agricultura muito relevante no país tem sido contra. Nas palavras do ministro da agricultura Norbert Totschnig: "O acordo com o Mercosul colocaria pressão sobre nossos fazendeiros familiares e, por extensão, no suprimento de segurança europeu."⁷⁰

Bélgica - Devido a legislação belga é necessário que as regiões do país votem e entrem em acordo comum em tomadas de decisão como essa. Onde foi encontrado um impasse devido ao posicionamento divergente das províncias, dentre elas a Valônia conhecida pela produção agrícola e pecuarista que se posicionou contra.⁷¹

Espanha - O governo espanhol está otimista em relação ao acordo "Vamos trabalhar conjuntamente para chegar a este acordo", disse Pedro Sánchez,⁷² primeiro ministro espanhol em reunião com Lula. A maior parte do PIB da Espanha é gerada no exterior devido a facilidade para a internacionalização de empresas, o governo Espanhol dá apoio a esta política econômica, com a ratificação traria vantagens para as empresas espanholas que já estão assentadas nos países membro do Mercosul, facilitaria o investimento espanhol nestes mesmos países e aumentaria as exportações, uma

⁶⁶ ACUERDO MERCOSUR - UNIÓN EUROPEA, **gub.uy**, disponível em: <https://www.gub.uy/ministerio-economia-finanzas/sites/ministerio-economia-finanzas/files/documentos/noticias/Acuerdo%20Mercosur%20-%20UE%2028%20de%20agosto.pdf> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

⁶⁷ ACUERDO DE ASOCIACION BIREGIONAL ENTRE EL MERCOSUR Y LA UNION EUORPEA- RESULTADOS DE LAS NEGOCIACIONES DEL CAPITULO COMERCIAL, **mre.gov.py**, disponível em: https://www.mre.gov.py/application/files/7915/6527/4753/Informe_para_el_Canciller_MS-UE_Final_Final_2_julio_2019_con_TConsularVS2.pdf Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024

⁶⁸ MARTINS, A. Presidente do Paraguai dá ultimato à União Europeia em nome do Mercosul, **cnnbrasil.com**, Disponível em: <https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/economia/macroeconomia/presidente-do-paraguai-da-ultimato-a-uniao-europeia-em-nome-do-mercotel>. Acesso em: 4 nov. 2024.

⁶⁹ "WE ARE UNITED BY CLIMATE PROTECTION – Something that benefits us all", **bundesregierung.de**, disponível em: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/search/intergovernmental-consultations-germany-brazil-2247412> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024

⁷⁰ SWATON, Chiara, Austrian agriculture minister says 'no' to Mercosur deal amid industry pressure, **bilaterals.org**, disponível em: <https://www.bilaterals.org/?austrian-agriculture-minister-says&lang=en>, acesso em 31 de out. de 2024

⁷¹ REGIÃO da Bélgica se diz "totalmente" contrária a acordo UE-Mercosul, **exame.com**, disponível em: <https://exame.com/economia/regiao-da-belgica-se-diz-totalmente-contraria-a-acordo-ue-mercotel> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

⁷² MAZUI, Guilherme, Ao lado do premiê da Espanha, Lula diz que acordo Mercosul-UE não regrediu e que Brasil está 'pronto' para assinar, **g1.globo.com**, disponível em: <https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2024/03/06/lula-premie-espanha-pedro-sanchez-acordo-mercotel-uniao-europeia.ghtml>, acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

de suas metas.

França - O governo francês vem se posicionando contra devido a grandes pressões internas demandas principalmente pelo setor agrícola, nas palavras do atual presidente Emmanuel Macron “um acordo muito ruim, para vocês e para nós”⁷³ e tem sua apelação para a criação de um novo acordo com mais pautas ambientais. É importante notar que as eleições próximas são um fator decisivo para esta decisão, apesar do atual bom relacionamento entre Brasil e França.

Grécia - Segundo **George Gerapetritis** (ministro das relações exteriores): “Nosso país certamente apoia o fortalecimento do diálogo entre a União Europeia e o Mercosul.”⁷⁴ Acrescentou também sobre fortalecer a cooperação econômica e comercial, principalmente no turismo e no investimento estrangeiro direto. A Grécia também ressalta a importância da comunidade grega residente no Brasil e que aproxima os dois países.

Irlanda - A ministra da Agricultura, comida e marinhos Irlandesa pediu para a inclusão de compromissos com a mudança climática, biodiversidade, combate ao desflorestamento e direitos trabalhistas no acordo.⁷⁵ Interessante notar também que a Irlanda é o maior produtor de carne bovina da União Europeia, porém a maior parte desta carne é exportada ao Reino Unido, mercado que já compete com os produtos do Mercosul. Em estudo divulgado em site oficial do Departamento de Empresas, Comércio e Emprego foi feita uma análise mostrando dados econômicos otimistas ao acordo.⁷⁶

Itália - Durante visita em Campinas a Subsecretaria de estado do Ministério de Assuntos Exteriores e cooperação internacional Maria Tripodi disse a seguinte frase: “Eu espero que a cooperação brasileira com as empresas italianas irá crescer, alinhado com o espírito do acordo entre a UE e o Mercosul, que a Itália apoia fortemente.”⁷⁷

Países Baixos - O parlamento Holandês se posicionou contra o acordo afirmando uma “concorrência desleal”⁷⁸. Com a produção agrícola e pecuarista interna do país, também foi ressaltado que os produtos oriundos do Mercosul não estariam de acordo com as normas sanitárias da União Europeia.

Portugal - Em 2019 quando foi enviado o texto para ratificação interna, Portugal já se posicionou a favor do acordo, no portal diplomático da república encontramos a citação: “O Governo português salienta que o Acordo consagra elevados padrões de segurança alimentar, de proteção dos consumidores e de cobertura das áreas social e ambiental, reforçando, nomeadamente, os compromissos assumidos no âmbito do Acordo de Paris.”⁷⁹

⁷³ MORLAND, Sarah, France's Macron says EU-Mercosur proposal is 'very bad deal' on visit to Brazil, **reuters.com**, disponível em: <https://www.reuters.com/world/frances-macron-says-proposed-eu-mercotur-agreement-is-very-bad-deal-2024-03-27/> acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

⁷⁴ Minister of Foreign Affairs George Gerapetritis' statements following his meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Mauro Vieira (Athens, 13.06.2024), **mfa.gr** disponível em: <https://www.mfa.gr/en/current-affairs/top-story/minister-of-foreign-affairs-george-gerapetritis-statements-following-his-meeting-with-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-brazil-mauro-vieira-athens-13062024.html> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024

⁷⁵ MINISTER McConalogue calls for further clarity regarding EU-Mercosur and EU-Australia Trade Negotiations, **gov.ie**, disponível em <https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/021b2-minister-mcconalogue-calls-for-further-clarity-regarding-eu-mercotur-and-eu-australia-trade-negotiations/> acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

⁷⁶ ECONOMIC AND SUSTAINABILITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, **enterprise.gov.ie**, disponível em <https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/publications/publication-files/economic-and-sustainability-impact-assessment-for-ireland-of-the-eu-mercotur-trade-agreement.pdf> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024

⁷⁷ BRAZIL Undersecretary Tripodi in Campinas to meet with the Mayor and visit the Inova, Pirelli, and Luxottica plants, **esteri.it**, disponível em: https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/04/brasile-il-sds-tripodi-a-campinas-incontra-il-sindaco-e-visita-inova-pirelli-e-luxottica/ Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024

⁷⁸ PARLAMENTO holandês aprova moção contra acordo Mercosul-UE, **dw.com**, disponível em: <https://www.dw.com/pt-br/parlamento-holand%C3%AAs-aprova-mo%C3%A7%C3%A3o-contra-acordo-mercotur-ue/a-64913889> Acesso em 31 de out. de 2024.

⁷⁹ COMUNICADO do Governo Português sobre a conclusão das negociações de um Acordo de Comércio entre a União Europeia e o MERCOSUL, **portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt**, disponível em <https://portaldiplomatico.mne.gov.pt/comunicacao-e-media/comunicados-de-imprensa/comunicado-do-governo-portugues-sobre-a-conclusao-das-negociacoes-de-um-acordo-de->

8. CONCLUSÃO

Percebemos que este acordo teve suas negociações retomadas em 2010 tentando buscar alternativas por parte do mercado europeu que havia sido amplamente afetado pela crise de 2008, não por acaso foram feitas mais negociações em 2012, momento em que as economias do Mercosul sentiram a crise que chegou de forma tardia na América do Sul. Em 2012 nós tivemos também o Impeachment de Fernando Lugo, presidente eleito democraticamente no Paraguai e um outro episódio de instabilidade política no Brasil que levou ao Impeachment da presidente Dilma Rousseff em agosto de 2016, logo após as retomadas das negociações.

Podemos observar que as trocas de governo dos países sul americanos neste momento podem ter influenciado as decisões dos executivos nacionais quanto às alterações destes textos em que poderiam priorizar seus objetivos políticos e alinhamentos ideológicos visto o momento de crise interna. Hoje estes governos latino americanos que negociaram o acordo já não são os mesmos e a Europa tem pautas de mais prioridade a tratar no momento, como a falta de fornecimento de gás natural. Não é só possível mas provável que este acordo fique no escanteio por enquanto..

Alguns países da União Europeia (a maioria deles) vêm o lado frutífero do acordo e até mesmo estudos feitos pela Irlanda que votou contra, comprovam que a economia do país não deve ser protecionista e temer os produtos oriundos do Mercosul em seu mercado interno. Porém é necessário notar que o consumidor europeu também não é favorável ao uso de antibióticos no cultivo agrário (prática comum no Mercosul) e caso o texto exclua a possibilidade da comercialização de produtos agrícolas e agropecuários, nenhum país do Mercosul irá aceitar o acordo, visto que suas economias são centradas na exportação destes produtos.

Alguns países contrários ao acordo sugerem uma série de controles ambientais por parte dos países agroexportadores sem nenhum incentivo ou ajuda para realizar tal controle, caso seja feito um novo acordo com demandas ambientais ao Brasil por exemplo, o país não pode comprometer o orçamento público na defesa da Amazônia em troca de um acordo comercial que pode ou não pagar esta mobilização feita pelo estado. É claro que estas demandas são um “freio” momentâneo no acordo, com expectativas irrealistas que não vão ser negociadas em um acordo futuro.

Concluimos nesta análise que por falta de interesse de certos integrantes, protecionismo do mercado interno, questões como o meio ambiente, alta rejeição a produtos transgênicos e outras demandas importantes a União Europeia se encontra dividida, mesmo com países de grande importância econômica como a Alemanha tentando promover a ratificação. Os próprios integrantes do Mercosul também estão descrentes ao acordo, visto que o longo período de negociações só resultou no aumento de suas responsabilidades sem nenhum ganho aparente, além de que os próprios governos do Mercosul passaram por mudanças que os fazem ter certa aversão a como o texto está escrito atualmente.

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